Spanish Civil War

The Spanish Civil War (Spanish: Guerra Civil Española)[note 2] was a civil war in Spain fought from 1936 to 1939. Republicans loyal to the left-leaning Second Spanish Republic, in alliance with anarchists, fought against a revolt by the Nationalists, an alliance of Falangists, monarchists, conservatives and Catholics, led by a military group among whom General Francisco Franco soon achieved a preponderant role. Due to the international political climate at the time, the war had many facets and was variously viewed as class struggle, a war of religion, a struggle between dictatorship and republican democracy, between revolution and counterrevolution, and between fascism and communism.[10] It has been frequently called the "dress rehearsal" for World War II.[11]

Spanish Civil War
Part of the Interwar period

Clockwise from top-left: members of the XI International Brigade at the Battle of Belchite; Bf 109 with Nationalist markings; bombing of an airfield in Spanish Sahara; Republican soldiers at the Siege of the Alcázar; Nationalist soldiers operating an anti-aircraft gun; HMS Royal Oak in an incursion around Gibraltar
Date17 July 1936 – 1 April 1939
(2 years, 8 months, 2 weeks and 1 day)

Nationalist victory




Commanders and leaders
1936 strength:[1]
  • 800,000+ combatants[2]
  • 31 ships
  • 12 submarines
  • 13,000 Sailors
1938 strength:[3]
  • 450,000 infantry
  • 350 aircraft
  • 200 tanks

59,380 international volunteers
3,015 Soviet technicians
772 Soviet pilots
1936 strength:[4]
  • 58,000 Army
  • 68,500 Gendarmes
  • 16 operational ships
  • 7,000 Sailors[5]
1938 strength:[6]
  • 600,000 infantry
  • 600 aircraft
  • 290 tanks

Casualties and losses
175,000 killed in action[7]
100,000–130,000 civilians killed inside the Francoist zone[8]
110,000 killed in action[7]
50,000 civilians killed inside the Republican zone[9]
149,213–2,000,000 total killed[note 1]
Events leading to World War II
  1. Treaty of Versailles 1919
  2. Polish-Soviet War 1919
  3. Treaty of Trianon 1920
  4. Treaty of Rapallo 1920
  5. Franco-Polish alliance 1921
  6. March on Rome 1922
  7. Corfu incident 1923
  8. Occupation of the Ruhr 19231925
  9. Mein Kampf 1925
  10. Pacification of Libya 19231932
  11. Dawes Plan 1924
  12. Locarno Treaties 1925
  13. Young Plan 1929
  14. Great Depression 19291941
  15. Japanese invasion of Manchuria 1931
  16. Pacification of Manchukuo 19311942
  17. January 28 Incident 1932
  18. World Disarmament Conference 19321934
  19. Defense of the Great Wall 1933
  20. Battle of Rehe 1933
  21. Nazis' rise to power in Germany 1933
  22. Tanggu Truce 1933
  23. Italo-Soviet Pact 1933
  24. Inner Mongolian Campaign 1933–1936
  25. German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact 1934
  26. Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance 1935
  27. Soviet–Czechoslovakia Treaty of Mutual Assistance 1935
  28. He–Umezu Agreement 1935
  29. Anglo-German Naval Agreement 1935
  30. December 9th Movement
  31. Second Italo-Ethiopian War 19351936
  32. Remilitarization of the Rhineland 1936
  33. Spanish Civil War 19361939
  34. Anti-Comintern Pact 1936
  35. Suiyuan Campaign 1936
  36. Xi'an Incident 1936
  37. Second Sino-Japanese War 19371945
  38. USS Panay incident 1937
  39. Anschluss Mar. 1938
  40. May crisis May 1938
  41. Battle of Lake Khasan JulyAug. 1938
  42. Undeclared German-Czechoslovak War Sep. 1938
  43. Munich Agreement Sep. 1938
  44. First Vienna Award Nov. 1938
  45. German occupation of Czechoslovakia Mar. 1939
  46. German ultimatum to Lithuania Mar. 1939
  47. Slovak–Hungarian War Mar. 1939
  48. Final offensive of the Spanish Civil War Mar.Apr. 1939
  49. Danzig Crisis Mar.Aug. 1939
  50. British guarantee to Poland Mar. 1939
  51. Italian invasion of Albania Apr. 1939
  52. Soviet–British–French Moscow negotiations Apr.Aug. 1939
  53. Pact of Steel May 1939
  54. Battles of Khalkhin Gol MaySep. 1939
  55. Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact Aug. 1939
  56. Invasion of Poland Sep. 1939

The Nationalists won the war, which ended in early 1939, and ruled Spain until Franco's death in November 1975.

The war began after a pronunciamiento (a declaration of military opposition) against the Republican government by a group of generals of the Spanish Republican Armed Forces, originally under the leadership of José Sanjurjo. The government at the time was a coalition of Republicans, supported in the Cortes by communist and socialist parties, under the leadership of centre-left President Manuel Azaña.[12][13] The Nationalist group was supported by a number of conservative groups, including CEDA, monarchists, including both the opposing Alfonsists and the religious conservative Carlists, and the FE y de las JONS, a fascist political party.[14] After the deaths of Sanjurjo, Emilio Mola and Manuel Goded Llopis, Franco emerged as the remaining leader of the Nationalist side.

The coup was supported by military units in the Spanish protectorate in Morocco, Pamplona, Burgos, Zaragoza, Valladolid, Cádiz, Córdoba, and Seville. However, rebelling units in some important cities—such as Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Bilbao, and Málaga—did not gain control, and those cities remained under the control of the government. Spain was thus left militarily and politically divided. The Nationalists and the Republican government fought for control of the country. The Nationalist forces received munitions, soldiers, and air support from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, while the Republican side received support from the Soviet Union and Mexico. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, continued to recognise the Republican government, but followed an official policy of non-intervention. Notwithstanding this policy, tens of thousands of citizens from non-interventionist countries directly participated in the conflict. They fought mostly in the pro-Republican International Brigades, which also included several thousand exiles from pro-Nationalist regimes.

The Nationalists advanced from their strongholds in the south and west, capturing most of Spain's northern coastline in 1937. They also besieged Madrid and the area to its south and west for much of the war. After much of Catalonia was captured in 1938 and 1939, and Madrid cut off from Barcelona, the Republican military position became hopeless. Following the fall without resistance of Barcelona in January 1939, the recognition of the Francoist regime by France and the United Kingdom in February 1939, and internal conflict between Republican factions in Madrid in March 1939, Franco entered the capital and declared victory on 1 April 1939. Hundreds of thousands of Spaniards fled to refugee camps in southern France.[15][15] Those associated with the losing Republicans who stayed were persecuted by the victorious Nationalists. With the establishment of a dictatorship led by General Franco in the aftermath of the war, all right-wing parties were fused into the structure of the Franco regime.[14]

The war became notable for the passion and political division it inspired and for the many atrocities that occurred, on both sides. Organised purges occurred in territory captured by Franco's forces so they could consolidate their future regime.[16] Mass executions on a lesser scale also took place in areas controlled by the Republicans,[17] with the participation of local authorities varying from location to location.[18][19]


The 19th century was a turbulent time for Spain. Those in favour of reforming Spain's government vied for political power with conservatives, who tried to prevent reforms from taking place. Some liberals, in a tradition that had started with the Spanish Constitution of 1812, sought to limit the power of the monarchy of Spain and to establish a liberal state. The reforms of 1812 did not last after King Ferdinand VII dissolved the Constitution and ended the Trienio Liberal government.[20] Twelve successful coups were carried out between 1814 and 1874.[20] Until the 1850s, the economy of Spain was primarily based on agriculture. There was little development of a bourgeois industrial or commercial class. The land-based oligarchy remained powerful; a small number of people held large estates called latifundia as well as all the important government positions.[21]

In 1868 popular uprisings led to the overthrow of Queen Isabella II of the House of Bourbon. Two distinct factors led to the uprisings: a series of urban riots and a liberal movement within the middle classes and the military (led by General Joan Prim) concerned with the ultra-conservatism of the monarchy. In 1873 Isabella's replacement, King Amadeo I of the House of Savoy, abdicated owing to increasing political pressure, and the short-lived First Spanish Republic was proclaimed.[22][23] After the restoration of the Bourbons in December 1874,[24] Carlists and Anarchists emerged in opposition to the monarchy.[25][26] Alejandro Lerroux, Spanish politician and leader of the Radical Republican Party, helped bring republicanism to the fore in Catalonia, where poverty was particularly acute.[27] Growing resentment of conscription and of the military culminated in the Tragic Week in Barcelona in 1909.[28]

Spain was neutral in World War I. Following the war, wide swathes of Spanish society, including the armed forces, united in hopes of removing the corrupt central government, but were unsuccessful.[29] Popular perception of communism as a major threat significantly increased during this period.[30] In 1923 a military coup brought Miguel Primo de Rivera to power; as a result, Spain transitioned to government by military dictatorship.[31] Support for the Rivera regime gradually faded, and he resigned in January 1930. He was replaced by General Dámaso Berenguer, who was in turn himself replaced by Admiral Juan Bautista Aznar-Cabañas; both men continued a policy of rule by decree. There was little support for the monarchy in the major cities. Consequently, King Alfonso XIII gave in to popular pressure for the establishment of a republic in 1931 and called municipal elections for 12 April of that year. The socialist and liberal republicans won almost all the provincial capitals, and following the resignation of Aznar's government, King Alfonso XIII fled the country.[32] At this time, the Second Spanish Republic was formed. It remained in power until the culmination of the Spanish Civil War.[33]

The revolutionary committee headed by Niceto Alcalá-Zamora became the provisional government, with Alcalá-Zamora as president and head of state.[34] The republic had broad support from all segments of society.[35] In May, an incident where a taxi driver was attacked outside a monarchist club sparked anti-clerical violence throughout Madrid and south-west Spain. The government's slow response disillusioned the right and reinforced their view that the Republic was determined to persecute the church. In June and July the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, known as the CNT, called several strikes, which led to a violent incident between CNT members and the Civil Guard and a brutal crackdown by the Civil Guard and the army against the CNT in Seville. This led many workers to believe the Spanish Second Republic was just as oppressive as the monarchy and the CNT announced their intention of overthrowing it via revolution.[36] Elections in June 1931 returned a large majority of Republicans and Socialists.[37] With the onset of the Great Depression, the government attempted to assist rural Spain by instituting an eight-hour day and redistributing land tenure to farm workers.[38][39] The rural workers lived in some of the worst poverty in Europe at the time and the government tried to increase their wages and improve working conditions. This estranged small and medium landholders who used hired labour. The Law of Municpal Boundaries forbade the hiring of workers from outside the locality of the owner's holdings. Since not all localities had enough labour for the tasks required, the law had unintended negative consequences, such as sometimes shutting out peasants and renters from the labour market when they needed extra income as pickers. Labour arbitration boards were set up to regulate salaries, contracts and working hours; they were more favourable to workers than employers and thus the latter became hostile to them. A July decree in 1931 increased overtime pay and several laws in late 1931 restricted who landowners were able to hire. Other efforts included decrees limiting the use of machinery, efforts to create a monopoly on hiring, strikes and efforts by unions to limit women's employment to preserve a labour monopoly for their members. Class struggle intensified as landowners turned to counterrevolutionary organisations and local oligarchs. Strikes, workplace thefts, arson, robbery and assaults on shops, strikebreakers, employers and machines became increasingly common. Ultimately the reforms of the Republican-Socialist government alienated as many people as they pleased.[40]

The Church was a frequent target of the revolutionary left in the Republic and in the War. During the Civil War, revolutionaries destroyed/burned some 20,000 churches, along with church artwork and tombs, books, archives, and palaces.[41][42] Vast number of affected buildings are today defunct.

Fascism remained a reactive threat, helped by controversial reforms to the military.[43] In December a new reformist, liberal, and democratic constitution was declared. It included strong provisions enforcing a broad secularisation of the Catholic country, which included the abolishing of Catholic schools and charities, which many moderate committed Catholics opposed.[44] Republican Manuel Azaña became prime minister of a minority government in October 1931.[45][46] In 1933 the parties of the right won the general elections, largely owing to the anarchists' abstention from the vote,[47] increased right-wing resentment of the incumbent government caused by a controversial decree implementing land reform,[48] the Casas Viejas incident,[49] and the formation of a right-wing alliance, Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Right-wing Groups (CEDA). The recent enfranchisement of women, most of whom voted for centre-right parties, was also a contributing factor.[50]

Events in the period following November 1933, called the "black two years", seemed to make a civil war more likely.[51] Alejandro Lerroux of the Radical Republican Party (RRP) formed a government, reversing changes made under the previous administration[52] and granting amnesty to the collaborators of the unsuccessful uprising by General José Sanjurjo in August 1932.[53][54] Some monarchists joined with the then fascist-nationalist Falange Española y de las JONS ("Falange") to help achieve their aims.[55] Open violence occurred in the streets of Spanish cities, and militancy continued to increase,[56] reflecting a movement towards radical upheaval, rather than peaceful democratic means as solutions.[57] On 5 October 1934, in response to an invitation to CEDA to form part of the government, the Acción Republicana and the Socialists (PSOE) and Communists attempted a general left-wing rebellion. The rebellion had a temporary success in Asturias and Barcelona, but was over in two weeks. Azaña was in Barcelona that day, and the Lerroux-CEDA government tried to implicate him. He was arrested and charged with complicity in the rebellion.[58] The October 1934 rebellion is regarded by historians as the beginning of the decline of the Spanish Republic and of constitutional government and constitutional consensus, as the Socialists and left Republicans had been integral to the new system and had governed for two years, yet the Socialists were now attempting a revolt against the democratic system and the left Republicans provided a sort of passive support for them.[59]

In the last months of 1934, two government collapses brought members of the CEDA into the government.[60][61] Farm workers' wages were cut in half, and the military was purged of Republican members.[61] Reversals of land reform resulted in the central and southern countryside in 1935 witnessing expulsions, firings and arbitrary changes to working conditions, with landowners' behaviour at times achieving "genuine cruelty", with violence being deployed against farmworkers and socialists, which resulted in several deaths. One historian argued that the behaviour of the right in the southern countryside was one of the main causes of hatred during the Civil War and possibly even the Civil War itself.[62] Landowners taunted workers by saying that if they went hungry, they should "Go eat Republic!"[63][64] Bosses fired leftist workers and imprisoned trade union and socialist militants and wages were reduced to "salaries of hunger."[65] A popular front alliance was organised,[61] which narrowly won the 1936 elections.[66] Azaña led a weak minority government, but soon replaced Zamora as president in April.[67] Prime Minister Santiago Casares Quiroga ignored warnings of a military conspiracy involving several generals, who decided that the government had to be replaced to prevent the dissolution of Spain.[68]

According to Stanley Payne, by July 1936 the situation in Spain had deteriorated massively. Spanish commentators spoke of chaos and preparation for revolution, foreign diplomats were making plans on what to do if revolution broke out and an interest in fascism was developing amongst the threatened. Payne states that by July 1936:

"The frequent overt violations of the law, assaults on property, and political violence in Spain were without precedent for a modern European country not undergoing total revolution. These included massive, sometimes violent and destructive strike waves, large-scale illegal seizures of farmland in the south, a wave of arson and destruction of property, arbitrary closure of Catholic schools, seizure of churches and Catholic property in some areas, widespread censorship, thousands of arbitrary arrests, virtual impunity for criminal action by members of Popular Front parties, manipulation and politicisation of justice, arbitrary dissolution of rightist organisations, coercive elections in Cuenca and Granada that excluded all opposition, subversion of the security forces, and a substantial growth in political violence, resulting in more than three hundred deaths. Moreover, because local and provincial governments were forcibly taken over, decreed by the government in much of the country rather than secured via any elections, they tended to have a coercive cast akin to that of local governments taken over by Italian Fascists in northern Italy during the summer of 1922. Yet as of early July the centrist and rightist opposition in Spain remained divided and impotent."[69]

Laia Balcells observes that polarisation in Spain just before the coup was so intense that physical confrontations between leftists and rightists were a routine occurrence in most localities; six days before the coup occurred, there was a riot between the two in the province of Teruel. Balcells notes that Spanish society was so divided along Left-Right lines that the monk Hilari Raguer stated that in his parish, instead of playing "cops and robbers", children would sometimes play "leftists and rightists."[70] Within the first month of the Popular Front's government, nearly a quarter of the provincial governors had been removed due to their failure to prevent or control strikes, illegal land occupation, political violence and arson. The Popular Front government was more likely to persecute rightists for violence than leftist who committed similar acts. Azaña was hesitant to use the army to shoot or stop rioters or protestors as many of them supported his coalition. On the other hand, he was reluctant to disarm the military as be believed he needed them to stop insurrections from the extreme left. Illegal land occupation became widespread - poor tenant farmers knew the government was disinclined to stop them. By April 1936, nearly 100,000 peasants had appropriated 400,000 hectares of land and perhaps as may as 1 million hectares by the start of the civil war; for comparison, the 1931-33 land reform had granted only 6000 peasants 45,000 hectares. As many strikes occurred between April and July as had occurred in the entirety of 1931. Workers increasingly demanded less work and more pay. "Social crimes" - refusing to pay for goods and rent - became increasingly common by workers, particularly in Madrid. In some cases this was done in the company of armed militants. Conservatives, the middle classes, businessmen and landowners became convinced that revolution had already begun.[71]

Military coup


The Republican government acted to remove suspect generals from influential posts. Franco was sacked as chief of staff and transferred to command of the Canary Islands.[72] Manuel Goded Llopis was removed as inspector general and was made general of the Balearic Islands. Emilio Mola was moved from head of the Army of Africa to military commander of Pamplona in Navarre.[72] This, however, allowed Mola to direct the mainland uprising. General José Sanjurjo became the figurehead of the operation and helped reach an agreement with the Carlists.[72] Mola was chief planner and second in command.[73] José Antonio Primo de Rivera was put in prison in mid-March in order to restrict the Falange.[72] However, government actions were not as thorough as they might have been, and warnings by the Director of Security and other figures were not acted upon.[74]

Mola's plan for the new regime was envisioned as a "republican dictatorship", modelled after Salazar's Portugal and as a semi-pluralist authoritarian regime rather than a totalitarian fascist dictatorship. The initial government would be an all-military "Directory", which would create a "strong and disciplined state." General Sanjurjo would be the head of this new regime, due to being widely liked and respected within the military, though his position would be a largely symbolic due to his lack of political talent. The 1931 Constitution would be suspended, replaced by a new "constituent parliament" which would be chosen by a new politically purged electorate, who would vote on the issue of republic versus monarchy. Certain liberal elements would remain, such as separation of church and state as well as freedom of religion. Agrarian issues would be solved by regional commissioners on the basis of smallholdings but collective cultivation would be permitted in some circumstances. Legislation prior to February 1936 would be respected.[75][76] The separation of church and state, however, was forgotten once the conflict assumed the dimensions of a war of religion and military authorities would become increasingly deferential to the Church and to the expression of Catholic sentiment.[77] However, Mola's program was vague and only a rough sketch and there were disagreements amongst the coupists as to what their vision for Spain should be.[78]

On 12 June, Prime Minister Casares Quiroga met General Juan Yagüe, who falsely convinced Casares of his loyalty to the republic.[79] Mola began serious planning in the spring.[73] Franco was a key player because of his prestige as a former director of the military academy and as the man who suppressed the Asturian miners' strike of 1934.[73] He was well respected in the Army of Africa, the Army's toughest troops.[80] He wrote a cryptic letter to Casares on 23 June, suggesting that the military was disloyal, but could be restrained if he were put in charge. Casares did nothing, failing to arrest or buy off Franco.[80] With the help of the British Secret Intelligence Service agents Cecil Bebb and Major Hugh Pollard, the rebels chartered a Dragon Rapide aircraft to transport Franco from the Canary Islands to Spanish Morocco.[81] The plane flew to the Canaries on 11 July, and Franco arrived in Morocco on 19 July.[82] According to Stanley Payne, Franco was offered this position as Mola's planning for the coup had become increasingly complex and it did not look like it would be as swift as he hoped, instead likely turning into a miniature civil war that would last several weeks. Mola thus had concluded that the troops in Spain were insufficient for the task and that it would be necessary to use elite units from North Africa, something which Franco had always believed would be necessary.[83]

On 12 July 1936, Falangists in Madrid killed a police officer, Lieutenant José Castillo of the Guardia de Asalto (Assault Guard). Castillo was a Socialist party member who, among other activities, was giving military training to the UGT youth. Castillo had led the Assault Guards that violently suppressed the riots after the funeral of Guardia Civil lieutenant Anastasio de los Reyes. (Los Reyes had been shot by anarchists during 14 April military parade commemorating the five years of the Republic.)[82]

Assault Guard Captain Fernando Condés was a close personal friend of Castillo. The next day, he led his squad to arrest José María Gil-Robles y Quiñones, founder of CEDA, as a reprisal for Castillo's murder. But he was not at home, so they went to the house of José Calvo Sotelo, a leading Spanish monarchist and a prominent parliamentary conservative.[84] Luis Cuenca, a member of the arresting group and a Socialist who was known as the bodyguard of PSOE leader Indalecio Prieto, summarily executed Calvo Sotelo by shooting him in the back of the neck.[84] Hugh Thomas concludes that Condés intended to arrest Sotelo, and that Cuenca acted on his own initiative, although he acknowledges other sources dispute this finding.[85]

Massive reprisals followed.[84] The killing of Calvo Sotelo with police involvement aroused suspicions and strong reactions among the government's opponents on the right.[86] Although the nationalist generals were already planning an uprising, the event provided a catalyst and a public justification for their coup.[84] Stanley Payne claims the idea of a rebellion by army officers against the government had weakened before these events, but the kidnapping and murder of Calvo Sotelo had an electrifying effect which provided a catalyst to transform what was a "limping conspiracy" (according to Payne, prior to Sotelo's death, Mola had estimated that only 12 percent of military officers would reliably support the coup and Mola had apparently at one point even considered fleeing the country out of fear he was already compromised and had to be convinced to remain by his co-conspirators)[87] to a powerful revolt that could set off a civil war. The involvement of forces of public order in the plot and a lack of punishment or action against the attackers hurt public opinion of the government. No effective action was taken; Payne points towards possible veto by socialists within the government who shielded the killers who had been drawn from their ranks. The murder of the leader of parliamentary opposition by state police was unprecedented and the belief that the state had ceased to be neutral and efficient in its duties encouraged important sectors of the right to join the rebellion.[88] Within hours of learning of the murder and the reaction Franco changed his mind on rebellion and dispatched a message to Mola to display his firm commitment.[89]

The Socialists and Communists, led by Indalecio Prieto, demanded that arms be distributed to the people before the military took over. The prime minister was hesitant.[84]

Beginning of the coup

The uprising's timing was fixed at 17 July, at 17:01, agreed to by the leader of the Carlists, Manuel Fal Conde.[90] However, the timing was changed—the men in the Spanish protectorate in Morocco were to rise up at 05:00 on 18 July and those in Spain proper a day later so that control of Spanish Morocco could be achieved and forces sent back to the Iberian Peninsula to coincide with the risings there.[91] The rising was intended to be a swift coup d'état, but the government retained control of most of the country.[92]

Control over Spanish Morocco was all but certain.[93] The plan was discovered in Morocco on 17 July, which prompted the conspirators to enact it immediately. Little resistance was encountered. In total, the rebels shot 189 people.[94] Goded and Franco immediately took control of the islands to which they were assigned.[73] On 18 July, Casares Quiroga refused an offer of help from the CNT and Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), leading the groups to proclaim a general strike—in effect, mobilising. They opened weapons caches, some buried since the 1934 risings.[93] The paramilitary security forces often waited to see the outcome of militia action before either joining or suppressing the rebellion. Quick action by either the rebels or anarchist militias was often enough to decide the fate of a town.[95] General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano managed to secure Seville for the rebels, arresting a number of other officers.[96]


The rebels failed to take any major cities with the critical exception of Seville, which provided a landing point for Franco's African troops, and the primarily conservative and Catholic areas of Old Castile and León, which fell quickly.[92] Cádiz was taken for the rebels, with the help of the first troops from the Army of Africa.[97]

The government retained control of Málaga, Jaén, and Almería. In Madrid, the rebels were hemmed into the Cuartel de la Montaña siege, which fell with considerable bloodshed. Republican leader Casares Quiroga was replaced by José Giral, who ordered the distribution of weapons among the civilian population.[98] This facilitated the defeat of the army insurrection in the main industrial centres, including Madrid, Barcelona, and Valencia, but it allowed anarchists to take control of Barcelona along with large swathes of Aragón and Catalonia.[99] General Goded surrendered in Barcelona and was later condemned to death.[100] The Republican government ended up controlling almost all of the east coast and central area around Madrid, as well as most of Asturias, Cantabria and part of the Basque Country in the north.[101]

The rebels termed themselves Nacionales, normally translated "Nationalists", although the former implies "true Spaniards" rather than a nationalistic cause.[102] The result of the coup was a nationalist area of control containing 11 million of Spain's population of 25 million.[103] The Nationalists had secured the support of around half of Spain's territorial army, some 60,000 men, joined by the Army of Africa, made up of 35,000 men,[104] and a little under half of Spain's militaristic police forces, the Assault Guards, the Civil Guards, and the Carabineers.[105] Republicans controlled under half of the rifles and about a third of both machine guns and artillery pieces.[104][106]

The Spanish Republican Army had just 18 tanks of a sufficiently modern design, and the Nationalists took control of 10.[107] Naval capacity was uneven, with the Republicans retaining a numerical advantage, but with the Navy's top commanders and two of the most modern ships, heavy cruisers Canarias—captured at the Ferrol shipyard—and Baleares, in Nationalist hands.[108] The Spanish Republican Navy suffered from the same problems as the army—many officers had defected or had been killed after trying to do so.[107] Two-thirds of air capability was retained by the government—however, the whole of the Republican Air Force was very outdated.[109]


The war was cast by Republican sympathisers as a struggle between tyranny and freedom, and by Nationalist supporters as communist and anarchist "red hordes" versus "Christian civilisation".[110] Nationalists also claimed they were bringing security and direction to an ungoverned and lawless country.[110] Spanish politics, especially on the left, was quite fragmented, since socialists and communists supported the republic. During the republic, anarchists had mixed opinions, but both major groups opposed the Nationalists during the Civil War. The Nationalists, in contrast, were united by their fervent opposition to the Republican government and presented a more unified front.[111]

The coup divided the armed forces fairly evenly. One historical estimate suggests that there were some 87,000 troops loyal to the government and some 77,000 joining the insurgency,[112] though some historians suggest that the Nationalist figure should be revised upwards and that it probably amounted to some 95,000.[113]

During the first few months both armies were joined in high numbers by volunteers, Nationalists by some 100,000 men and Republicans by some 120,000.[114] From August both sides launched their own, similarly scaled conscription schemes, resulting in further massive growth of their armies. Finally, the final months of 1936 saw the arrival of foreign troops, International Brigades joining the Republicans and Italian CTV, German Legion Condor and Portuguese Viriatos joining the Nationalists. The result was that in April 1937 there were some 360,000 soldiers in the Republican ranks and some 290,000 in the Nationalist ones.[115]

The armies kept growing. The principal source of manpower was conscription; both sides continued and expanded their schemes, the Nationalists drafting somewhat more aggressively, and there was little room left for volunteering. Foreigners contributed little to further growth; on the Nationalist side the Italians scaled down their engagement, while on the Republican side the influx of new interbrigadistas did not cover losses suffered by these units on the front. At the turn of 1937/1938 both armies achieved numerical parity and equalled about 700,000 each.[116]

Throughout 1938 the principal if not exclusive source of new men was a draft; at this stage it was the Republicans who conscripted more aggressively. In the middle of the year, just prior to the Battle of Ebro, the Republicans achieved their all-time high, commanding an army of slightly above 800,000; this was already no match for the Nationalists, who numbered 880,000.[117] The Battle of Ebro, fall of Catalonia and collapsing discipline produced a massive shrinking of the Republican troops. In late February 1939 their army was 400,000[118] compared to more than double that number of Nationalists. In the moment of their final victory, the latter commanded over 900,000 troops.[119]

The total number of Spaniards serving in the Republican forces was officially stated as 917,000; later scholarly work estimated the number as "well over 1 million men",[120] though earlier studies claimed a Republican total of 1.75 million (including non-Spaniards).[121] The total number of Spaniards serving in the Nationalist units is estimated at "nearly 1 million men",[120] though earlier works claimed a total of 1.26 million Nationalists (including non-Spaniards).[122]


Flags of the Popular Front (left) and CNT/FAI (right). The slogan of the CNT/FAI anarchists was "Ni dios, ni estado, ni patrón" ("Neither god, Nor state, Nor boss"), widespread by the Spanish anarchists since 1910.

Only two countries openly and fully supported the Republic: Mexico and the USSR. From them, especially the USSR, the Republic received diplomatic support, volunteers, weapons and vehicles. Other countries remained neutral, this neutrality faced serious opposition from sympathizers in the United States and United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent in other European countries and from Marxists worldwide. This led to formation of the International Brigades, thousands of foreigners of all nationalities who voluntarily went to Spain to aid the Republic in the fight; they meant a great deal to morale but militarily were not very significant.

The Republic's supporters within Spain ranged from centrists who supported a moderately-capitalist liberal democracy to revolutionary anarchists who opposed the Republic but sided with it against the coup forces. Their base was primarily secular and urban but also included landless peasants and was particularly strong in industrial regions like Asturias, the Basque country, and Catalonia.[123]

This faction was called variously leales "Loyalists" by supporters, "Republicans", the "Popular Front", or "the government" by all parties; and/or los rojos "the Reds" by their opponents.[124] Republicans were supported by urban workers, agricultural labourers, and parts of the middle class.[125]

The conservative, strongly Catholic Basque country, along with Catholic Galicia and the more left-leaning Catalonia, sought autonomy or independence from the central government of Madrid. The Republican government allowed for the possibility of self-government for the two regions,[126] whose forces were gathered under the People's Republican Army (Ejército Popular Republicano, or EPR), which was reorganised into mixed brigades after October 1936.[127]

A few well-known people fought on the Republican side, such as English novelist George Orwell (who wrote Homage to Catalonia (1938), an account of his experiences in the war)[128] and Canadian thoracic surgeon Norman Bethune, who developed a mobile blood-transfusion service for front-line operations.[129] Simone Weil added herself for a while to the anarchist columns of Buenaventura Durruti, though fellow fighters feared she might inadvertently shoot them because she was short-sighted, and tried to avoid taking her on missions. By the account of her biographer Simone Petrement, Weil was evacuated from the front after a matter of weeks because of an injury sustained in a cooking accident.[130]


The Nacionales or Nationalists, also called "insurgents", "rebels" or, by opponents, Franquistas or "fascists" —feared national fragmentation and opposed the separatist movements. They were chiefly defined by their anti-communism, which galvanised diverse or opposed movements like Falangists and monarchists. Their leaders had a generally wealthier, more conservative, monarchist, landowning background.[124]

The Nationalist side included the Carlists and Alfonsists, Spanish nationalists, the fascist Falange, and most conservatives and monarchist liberals. Virtually all Nationalist groups had strong Catholic convictions and supported the native Spanish clergy.[124] The Nationals included the majority of the Catholic clergy and practitioners (outside of the Basque region), important elements of the army, most large landowners, and many businessmen.[110] The Nationalist base largely consisted of the middle classes, conservative peasant smallholders in the North and Catholics in general. Catholic support became particularly pronounced as a consequence of the burning of churches and killing of priests in most leftists zones during the first six months of the war. By mid-1937, the Catholic Church gave its official blessing to the Franco regime; religious fervor was a major source of emotional support for the Nationalists during the civil war.[131] Michael Seidmann reports that devout Catholics, such as seminary students, often volunteered to fight and would die in disproportionate numbers in the war. Catholic confession cleared the soldiers of moral doubt and increased fighting ability; Republican newspapers described Nationalist priests as ferocious in battle and Indalecio Prieto remarked that the enemy he feared most was "the requeté who has just received communion."[132]

One of the rightists' principal motives was to confront the anti-clericalism of the Republican regime and to defend the Catholic Church,[124] which had been targeted by opponents, including Republicans, who blamed the institution for the country's ills. The Church was against many of the Republicans' reforms, which were fortified by the Spanish Constitution of 1931.[133] Articles 24 and 26 of the 1931 constitution had banned the Society of Jesus. This proscription deeply offended many within the conservative fold. The revolution in the Republican zone at the outset of the war, in which 7,000 clergy and thousands of lay people were killed, deepened Catholic support for the Nationalists.[134][135]

Prior to the war, during the Asturian miners' strike of 1934, religious buildings were burnt and at least 100 clergy, religious civilians, and pro-Catholic police were killed by revolutionaries.[136][137] Franco had brought in Spain's colonial Army of Africa (Spanish: Ejército de África or Cuerpo de Ejército Marroquí) and reduced the miners to submission by heavy artillery attacks and bombing raids. The Spanish Legion committed atrocities and the army carried out summary executions of leftists. The repression in the aftermath was brutal and prisoners were tortured.[138]

The Moroccan Fuerzas Regulares Indígenas joined the rebellion and played a significant role in the civil war.[139]

Other factions

Catalan and Basque nationalists were not univocal. Left-wing Catalan nationalists sided with the Republicans, while Conservative Catalan nationalists were far less vocal in supporting the government due to anti-clericalism and confiscations occurring in areas within its control. Basque nationalists, heralded by the conservative Basque Nationalist Party, were mildly supportive of the Republican government, although some in Navarre sided with the uprising for the same reasons influencing conservative Catalans. Notwithstanding religious matters, Basque nationalists, who were for the most part Catholic, generally sided with the Republicans, although the PNV, Basque nationalist party, was reported passing the plans of Bilbao defences to the nationalists, in an attempt to reduce the duration and casualties of siege.[140]

Foreign involvement

The Spanish Civil War exposed political divisions across Europe. The right and the Catholics supported the Nationalists as a way to stop the expansion of Bolshevism. On the left, including labour unions, students and intellectuals, the war represented a necessary battle to stop the spread of fascism. Anti-war and pacifist sentiment was strong in many countries, leading to warnings that the Civil War had the potential of escalating into a second world war.[141] In this respect, the war was an indicator of the growing instability across Europe.[142]

The Spanish Civil War involved large numbers of non-Spanish citizens who participated in combat and advisory positions. Britain and France led a political alliance of 27 nations that promised non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War, including an embargo on all arms to Spain. The United States unofficially went along. Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union signed on officially, but ignored the embargo. The attempted suppression of imported material was largely ineffective, however, and France especially was accused of allowing large shipments to Republican troops.[143] The clandestine actions of the various European powers were, at the time, considered to be risking another world war, alarming antiwar elements across the world.[144]

The League of Nations' reaction to the war was influenced by a fear of communism,[145] and was insufficient to contain the massive importation of arms and other war resources by the fighting factions. Although a Non-Intervention Committee was formed, its policies accomplished little and its directives were ineffective.[146]

Support for the Nationalists


As the conquest of Ethiopia in the Second Italo-Ethiopian War made the Italian government confident in its military power, Benito Mussolini joined the war to secure Fascist control of the Mediterranean,[147] supporting the Nationalists to a greater extent than the National-Socialists did.[148] The Royal Italian Navy (Italian: Regia Marina) played a substantial role in the Mediterranean blockade, and ultimately Italy supplied machine guns, artillery, aircraft, tankettes, the Aviazione Legionaria, and the Corpo Truppe Volontarie (CTV) to the Nationalist cause.[149] The Italian CTV would, at its peak, supply the Nationalists with 50,000 men.[149] Italian warships took part in breaking the Republican navy's blockade of Nationalist-held Spanish Morocco and took part in naval bombardment of Republican-held Málaga, Valencia, and Barcelona.[150] In total, Italy provided the Nationalists with 660 planes, 150 tanks, 800 artillery pieces, 10,000 machine guns, and 240,000 rifles.[151]


German involvement began days after fighting broke out in July 1936. Adolf Hitler quickly sent in powerful air and armored units to assist the Nationalists. The war provided combat experience with the latest technology for the German military. However, the intervention also posed the risk of escalating into a world war for which Hitler was not ready. He therefore limited his aid, and instead encouraged Benito Mussolini to send in large Italian units.[152]

Nazi Germany's actions included the formation of the multitasking Condor Legion, a unit composed of volunteers from the Luftwaffe and the German Army (Heer) from July 1936 to March 1939. The Condor Legion proved to be especially useful in the 1936 Battle of the Toledo. Germany moved the Army of Africa to mainland Spain in the war's early stages.[153] German operations slowly expanded to include strike targets, most notably—and controversially—the bombing of Guernica which, on 26 April 1937, killed 200 to 300 civilians.[154] Germany also used the war to test out new weapons, such as the Luftwaffe Junkers Ju 87 Stukas and Junkers Ju-52 transport Trimotors (used also as Bombers), which showed themselves to be effective.[155]

German involvement was further manifested through undertakings such as Operation Ursula, a U-boat undertaking; and contributions from the Kriegsmarine. The Legion spearheaded many Nationalist victories, particularly in aerial combat,[156] while Spain further provided a proving ground for German tank tactics. The training which German units provided to the Nationalist forces would prove valuable. By the War's end, perhaps 56,000 Nationalist soldiers, encompassing infantry, artillery, aerial and naval forces, had been trained by German detachments.[153]

A total of approximately 16,000 German citizens fought in the war, with approximately 300 killed,[157] though no more than 10,000 participated at any one time. German aid to the Nationalists amounted to approximately £43,000,000 ($215,000,000) in 1939 prices,[157][note 3] 15.5 percent of which was used for salaries and expenses and 21.9 percent for direct delivery of supplies to Spain, while 62.6 percent was expended on the Condor Legion.[157] In total, Germany provided the Nationalists with 600 planes and 200 tanks.[158]


The Estado Novo regime of Portuguese Prime Minister António de Oliveira Salazar played an important role in supplying Franco's forces with ammunition and logistical help.[159]

Despite its discreet direct military involvement—restrained to a somewhat "semi-official" endorsement, by its authoritarian regime, of a "Viriatos Legion" volunteer force was organised, but disbanded, due to political unrest.[160] Between 8,000[160] and 12,000[161] would-be legionaries did still volunteer, only now as part of various Nationalist units instead of a unified force. Due to the widespread publicity given to the Viriatos Legion previously, these Portuguese volunteers were still called "Viriatos".[162][163] Portugal was instrumental in providing the Nationalists with organizational skills and reassurance from the Iberian neighbour to Franco and his allies that no interference would hinder the supply traffic directed to the Nationalist cause.[164]


The Conservative government of the UK maintained a position of strong neutrality and was supported by elites and the media, while the left mobilized aid to the Republic.[165] The government refused to allow arms shipments and sent warships to try to stop shipments. It was theoretically a crime to volunteer to fight in Spain, but about 4,000 went anyway. Intellectuals strongly favoured the Republicans. Many visited Spain, hoping to find authentic anti-fascism. They had little impact on the government, and could not shake the strong public mood for peace.[166] The Labour Party was split, with its Catholic element favouring the Nationalists. It officially endorsed the boycott and expelled a faction that demanded support for the Republican cause; but it finally voiced some support to Loyalists.[167]

Romanian volunteers were led by Ion Moța, deputy-leader of the Iron Guard ("Legion of the Archangel Michael"), whose group of Seven Legionaries visited Spain in December 1936 to ally their movement with the Nationalists.[168]

Despite the Irish government's prohibition against participating in the war, about 600 Irishmen, followers of the Irish political activist and co-founder of the recently created political party of Fine Gael (unofficially called "The Blue Shirts"), Eoin O'Duffy, known as the "Irish Brigade", went to Spain to fight alongside Franco.[162] The majority of the volunteers were Catholics, and according to O'Duffy had volunteered to help the Nationalists fight against communism.[169][170]

Support for the Republicans

International Brigades

Many non-Spaniards, often affiliated with radical communist or socialist entities, joined the International Brigades, believing that the Spanish Republic was a front line in the war against fascism. The units represented the largest foreign contingent of those fighting for the Republicans. Roughly 40,000 foreign nationals fought with the Brigades, though no more than 18,000 were in the conflict at any given time. They claimed to represent 53 nations.[171]

Significant numbers of volunteers came from in the French Third Republic (10,000), Nazi Germany, the Federal State of Austria (5,000) and the Kingdom of Italy (3,350). More than 1000 each came from the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Second Polish Republic, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Kingdom of Hungary and Canada.[171] The Thälmann Battalion, a group of Germans, and the Garibaldi Battalion, a group of Italians, distinguished their units during the Siege of Madrid. Americans fought in units such as the XV International Brigade ("Abraham Lincoln Brigade"), while Canadians joined the Mackenzie–Papineau Battalion.[172]

More than 500 Romanians fought on the Republican side, including Romanian Communist Party members Petre Borilă and Valter Roman.[173] About 145 men[174] from Ireland formed the Connolly Column, which was immortalized by Irish folk musician Christy Moore in the song "Viva la Quinta Brigada". Some Chinese joined the Brigades; the majority of them eventually returned to China, but some went to prison or to French refugee camps, and a handful remained in Spain.[175]

Soviet Union

Though General Secretary Joseph Stalin had signed the Non-Intervention Agreement, the Soviet Union contravened the League of Nations embargo by providing material assistance to the Republican forces, becoming their only source of major weapons. Unlike Hitler and Mussolini, Stalin tried to do this covertly.[176] Estimates of material provided by the USSR to the Republicans vary between 634 and 806 aircraft, 331 and 362 tanks and 1,034 to 1,895 artillery pieces.[177] Stalin also created Section X of the Soviet Union military to head the weapons shipment operation, called Operation X. Despite Stalin's interest in aiding the Republicans, the quality of arms was inconsistent.[178][179] Many rifles and field guns provided were old, obsolete or otherwise of limited use (some dated back to the 1860s) but the T-26 and BT-5 tanks were modern and effective in combat.[178] The Soviet Union supplied aircraft that were in current service with their own forces but the aircraft provided by Germany to the Nationalists proved superior by the end of the war.[179]

The process of shipping arms from Russia to Spain was extremely slow. Many shipments were lost or arrived only partially matching what had been authorised.[180] Stalin ordered shipbuilders to include false decks in the design of ships and while at sea, Soviet captains employed deceptive flags and paint schemes to evade detection by the Nationalists.[181]

The USSR sent 2,000–3,000 military advisers to Spain; while the Soviet commitment of troops was fewer than 500 men at a time, Soviet volunteers often operated Soviet-made tanks and aircraft, particularly at the beginning of the war.[182][183][184][171]

The Republic paid for Soviet arms with official Bank of Spain gold reserves, 176 tonnes of which was transferred through France and 510 directly to Russia,[185] which was called Moscow gold.

Also, the Soviet Union directed Communist parties around the world to organise and recruit the International Brigades.[186]

Another significant Soviet involvement was the activity of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) inside the Republican rearguard. Communist figures including Vittorio Vidali ("Comandante Contreras"), Iosif Grigulevich, Mikhail Koltsov and, most prominently, Aleksandr Mikhailovich Orlov led operations that included the murders of Catalan anti-Stalinist Communist politician Andrés Nin, the socialist journalist Mark Rein, and the independent left-wing activist José Robles.[187] Another NKVD-led operation was the shooting down (in December 1936) of the French aircraft in which the delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Georges Henny, carried extensive documentation on the Paracuellos massacres to France.[188]


Unlike the United States and major Latin American governments, such as the ABC nations and Peru, Mexico supported the Republicans.[189][190] Mexico refused to follow the French-British non-intervention proposals,[189] furnishing $2,000,000 in aid and material assistance, which included 20,000 rifles and 20 million cartridges.[189]

Mexico's most important contributions to the Spanish Republic was its diplomatic help, as well as the sanctuary the nation arranged for Republican refugees, including Spanish intellectuals and orphaned children from Republican families. Some 50,000 took refuge, primarily in Mexico City and Morelia, accompanied by $300 million in various treasures still owned by the Left.[191]


Fearing it might spark a civil war inside France, the leftist "Popular Front" government in France did not send direct support to the Republicans. French Prime Minister Léon Blum was sympathetic to the republic,[192] fearing that the success of Nationalist forces in Spain would result in the creation of an ally state of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, an alliance that would nearly encircle France.[192] Right-wing politicians opposed any aid and attacked the Blum government.[193] In July 1936, British officials convinced Blum not to send arms to the Republicans and, on 27 July, the French government declared that it would not send military aid, technology or forces to assist the Republican forces.[194] However, Blum made clear that France reserved the right to provide aid should it wish to the Republic: "We could have delivered arms to the Spanish Government [Republicans], a legitimate government... We have not done so, in order not to give an excuse to those who would be tempted to send arms to the rebels [Nationalists]."[195]

On 1 August 1936 a pro-Republican rally of 20,000 people confronted Blum, demanding that he send aircraft to the Republicans, at the same time as right-wing politicians attacked Blum for supporting the Republic and being responsible for provoking Italian intervention on the side of Franco.[195] Germany informed the French ambassador in Berlin that Germany would hold France responsible if it supported "the manoeuvres of Moscow" by supporting the Republicans.[196] On 21 August 1936, France signed the Non-Intervention Agreement.[196] However, the Blum government provided aircraft to the Republicans through covert means with Potez 540 bomber aircraft (nicknamed the "Flying Coffin" by Spanish Republican pilots),[197] Dewoitine aircraft, and Loire 46 fighter aircraft being sent from 7 August 1936 to December of that year to Republican forces.[198] The French also sent pilots and engineers to the Republicans.[199] Also, until 8 September 1936, aircraft could freely pass from France into Spain if they were bought in other countries.[200]

French novelist André Malraux was a strong supporter of the republican cause; he tried to organise a volunteer air force (Escadrile Espana) on the republican side but as a practical organiser and squadron leader he was somewhat idealistic and inefficient. The Regular Spanish Air force commander Andrés García La Calle was openly critical of Malraux's military efficiency but recognised his usefulness as a propagandist. His novel L'Espoir and the film version he produced and directed (Espoir: Sierra de Teruel) were a great help for the Republican cause in France.

Even after covert support by France to the Republicans ended in December 1936, the possibility of French intervention against the Nationalists remained a serious possibility throughout the war. German intelligence reported to Franco and the Nationalists that the French military was engaging in open discussions about intervention in the war through French military intervention in Catalonia and the Balearic Islands.[201] In 1938 Franco feared an immediate French intervention against a potential Nationalist victory in Spain through French occupation of Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, and Spanish Morocco.[202]

Course of the war


A large air and sealift of Nationalist troops in Spanish Morocco was organised to the southwest of Spain.[203] Coup leader Sanjurjo was killed in a plane crash on 20 July,[204][205] leaving an effective command split between Mola in the North and Franco in the South.[73] This period also saw the worst actions of the so-called "Red" and "White Terrors" in Spain.[206][207] On 21 July, the fifth day of the rebellion, the Nationalists captured the central Spanish naval base, located in Ferrol, Galicia.[208]

A rebel force under Colonel Alfonso Beorlegui Canet, sent by General Mola and Colonel Esteban García, undertook the Campaign of Gipuzkoa from July to September. The capture of Gipuzkoa isolated the Republican provinces in the north. On 5 September, the Nationalists closed the French border to the Republicans in the battle of Irún.[209] On 15 September San Sebastián, home to a divided Republican force of anarchists and Basque nationalists, was taken by Nationalist soldiers.[164]

The Republic proved ineffective militarily, relying on disorganised revolutionary militias. The Republican government under Giral resigned on 4 September, unable to cope with the situation, and was replaced by a mostly Socialist organisation under Francisco Largo Caballero.[210] The new leadership began to unify central command in the republican zone.[211]

On the Nationalist side, Franco was chosen as chief military commander at a meeting of ranking generals at Salamanca on 21 September, now called by the title Generalísimo.[73][214] Franco won another victory on 27 September when his troops relieved the siege of the Alcázar in Toledo,[214] which had been held by a Nationalist garrison under Colonel José Moscardó Ituarte since the beginning of the rebellion, resisting thousands of Republican troops, who completely surrounded the isolated building. Moroccans and elements of the Spanish Legion came to the rescue.[215] Two days after relieving the siege, Franco proclaimed himself Caudillo ("chieftain", the Spanish equivalent of the Italian Duce and the German Führer—meaning: 'director') while forcibly unifying the various and diverse Falangist, Royalist and other elements within the Nationalist cause.[210] The diversion to Toledo gave Madrid time to prepare a defense, but was hailed as a major propaganda victory and personal success for Franco.[216] On 1 October 1936, General Franco was confirmed head of state and armies in Burgos. A similar dramatic success for the Nationalists occurred on 17 October, when troops coming from Galicia relieved the besieged town of Oviedo, in Northern Spain.[217][218]

In October, the Francoist troops launched a major offensive toward Madrid,[219] reaching it in early November and launching a major assault on the city on 8 November.[220] The Republican government was forced to shift from Madrid to Valencia, outside the combat zone, on 6 November.[221] However, the Nationalists' attack on the capital was repulsed in fierce fighting between 8 and 23 November. A contributory factor in the successful Republican defense was the effectiveness of the Fifth Regiment[222] and later the arrival of the International Brigades, though only an approximate 3,000 foreign volunteers participated in the battle.[223] Having failed to take the capital, Franco bombarded it from the air and, in the following two years, mounted several offensives to try to encircle Madrid, beginning the three-year Siege of Madrid. The Second Battle of the Corunna Road, a Nationalist offensive to the northwest, pushed Republican forces back, but failed to isolate Madrid. The battle lasted into January.[224]


With his ranks swelled by Italian troops and Spanish colonial soldiers from Morocco, Franco made another attempt to capture Madrid in January and February 1937, but was again unsuccessful. The Battle of Málaga started in mid-January, and this Nationalist offensive in Spain's southeast would turn into a disaster for the Republicans, who were poorly organised and armed. The city was taken by Franco on 8 February.[225] The consolidation of various militias into the Republican Army had started in December 1936.[226] The main Nationalist advance to cross the Jarama and cut the supply to Madrid by the Valencia road, termed the Battle of Jarama, led to heavy casualties (6,000–20,000) on both sides. The operation's main objective was not met, though Nationalists gained a modest amount of territory.[227]

A similar Nationalist offensive, the Battle of Guadalajara, was a more significant defeat for Franco and his armies. This was the only publicised Republican victory of the war. Franco used Italian troops and blitzkrieg tactics; while many strategists blamed Franco for the rightists' defeat, the Germans believed it was the former at fault for the Nationalists' 5,000 casualties and loss of valuable equipment.[228] The German strategists successfully argued that the Nationalists needed to concentrate on vulnerable areas first.[229]

The "War in the North" began in mid-March,[230] with the Biscay Campaign.[231] The Basques suffered most from the lack of a suitable air force.[232] On 26 April, the Condor Legion bombed the town of Guernica, killing 200–300 and causing significant damage. The destruction had a significant effect on international opinion.[233] The Basques retreated.[234]

April and May saw the May Days, infighting among Republican groups in Catalonia. The dispute was between an ultimately victorious government—Communist forces and the anarchist CNT. The disturbance pleased Nationalist command, but little was done to exploit Republican divisions.[235] After the fall of Guernica, the Republican government began to fight back with increasing effectiveness. In July, it made a move to recapture Segovia, forcing Franco to delay his advance on the Bilbao front, but for only two weeks. A similar Republican attack, the Huesca Offensive, failed similarly.[236]

Mola, Franco's second-in-command, was killed on 3 June, in an airplane accident.[237] In early July, despite the earlier loss at the Battle of Bilbao, the government launched a strong counter-offensive to the west of Madrid, focusing on Brunete. The Battle of Brunete, however, was a significant defeat for the Republic, which lost many of its most accomplished troops. The offensive led to an advance of 50 square kilometres (19 sq mi), and left 25,000 Republican casualties.[238]

A Republican offensive against Zaragoza was also a failure. Despite having land and aerial advantages, the Battle of Belchite, a place lacking any military interest, resulted in an advance of only 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) and the loss of much equipment.[239] Franco invaded Aragón and took the city of Santander in Cantabria in August.[240] With the surrender of the Republican army in the Basque territory came the Santoña Agreement.[241] Gijón finally fell in late October in the Asturias Offensive.[242] Franco had effectively won in the north. At November's end, with Franco's troops closing in on Valencia, the government had to move again, this time to Barcelona.[243]


The Battle of Teruel was an important confrontation. The city, which had formerly belonged to the Nationalists, was conquered by Republicans in January. The Francoist troops launched an offensive and recovered the city by 22 February, but Franco was forced to rely heavily on German and Italian air support.[244]

On 7 March, Nationalists launched the Aragon Offensive, and by 14 April they had pushed through to the Mediterranean, cutting the Republican-held portion of Spain in two. The Republican government attempted to sue for peace in May,[245] but Franco demanded unconditional surrender, and the war raged on. In July, the Nationalist army pressed southward from Teruel and south along the coast toward the capital of the Republic at Valencia, but was halted in heavy fighting along the XYZ Line, a system of fortifications defending Valencia.[246]

The Republican government then launched an all-out campaign to reconnect their territory in the Battle of the Ebro, from 24 July until 26 November, where Franco personally took command.[247] The campaign was unsuccessful, and was undermined by the Franco-British appeasement of Hitler in Munich. The agreement with Britain effectively destroyed Republican morale by ending hope of an anti-fascist alliance with Western powers.[248] The retreat from the Ebro all but determined the final outcome of the war.[247] Eight days before the new year, Franco threw massive forces into an invasion of Catalonia.[249]


Franco's troops conquered Catalonia in a whirlwind campaign during the first two months of 1939. Tarragona fell on 15 January,[250] followed by Barcelona on 26 January[251] and Girona on 2 February.[252] On 27 February, the United Kingdom and France recognized the Franco regime.[253]

Only Madrid and a few other strongholds remained for the Republican forces. On 5 March 1939 the Republican army, led by the Colonel Segismundo Casado and the politician Julián Besteiro, rose against the prime minister Juan Negrín and formed the National Defence Council (Consejo Nacional de Defensa or CND) to negotiate a peace deal.[254] Negrín fled to France on 6 March,[255] but the Communist troops around Madrid rose against the junta, starting a brief civil war within the civil war.[256] Casado defeated them, and began peace negotiations with the Nationalists, but Franco refused to accept anything less than unconditional surrender.[257]

On 26 March, the Nationalists started a general offensive, on 28 March the Nationalists occupied Madrid and, by 31 March, they controlled all Spanish territory.[258] Franco proclaimed victory in a radio speech aired on 1 April, when the last of the Republican forces surrendered.[259]

After the end of the war, there were harsh reprisals against Franco's former enemies.[260] Thousands of Republicans were imprisoned and at least 30,000 executed.[261] Other estimates of these deaths range from 50,000[262] to 200,000, depending on which deaths are included. Many others were put to forced labour, building railways, draining swamps, and digging canals.[262]

Hundreds of thousands of Republicans fled abroad, with some 500,000 fleeing to France.[263] Refugees were confined in internment camps of the French Third Republic, such as Camp Gurs or Camp Vernet, where 12,000 Republicans were housed in squalid conditions. In his capacity as consul in Paris, Chilean poet and politician Pablo Neruda organised the immigration to Chile of 2,200 Republican exiles in France using the ship SS Winnipeg.[264]

Of the 17,000 refugees housed in Gurs, farmers and others who could not find relations in France were encouraged by the Third Republic, in agreement with the Francoist government, to return to Spain. The great majority did so and were turned over to the Francoist authorities in Irún.[265] From there, they were transferred to the Miranda de Ebro camp for "purification" according to the Law of Political Responsibilities. After the proclamation by Marshal Philippe Pétain of the Vichy regime, the refugees became political prisoners, and the French police attempted to round up those who had been liberated from the camp. Along with other "undesirable" people, the Spaniards were sent to the Drancy internment camp before being deported to Nazi Germany. About 5,000 Spaniards died in the Mauthausen concentration camp.[265]

After the official end of the war, guerrilla warfare was waged on an irregular basis by the Spanish Maquis well into the 1950s, gradually reduced by military defeats and scant support from the exhausted population. In 1944, a group of republican veterans, who also fought in the French resistance against the Nazis, invaded the Val d'Aran in northwest Catalonia, but were defeated after 10 days.[266]

Evacuation of children

The Republicans oversaw the evacuation of 30,000–35,000 children from their zone,[268] starting with Basque areas, from which 20,000 were evacuated. Their destinations included the United Kingdom[269] and the USSR, and many other locations in Europe, along with Mexico.[268] On 21 May 1937, around 4,000 Basque children were taken to the UK on the aging steamship SS Habana from the Spanish port of Santurtzi. This was against initial opposition from both the government and charitable groups, who saw the removal of children from their native country as potentially harmful. On arrival two days later in Southampton, the children were dispersed all over England, with over 200 children accommodated in Wales.[270] The upper age limit was initially set at 12, but raised to 15.[271] By mid-September, all of los niños, as they became known, had found homes with families. Most were repatriated to Spain after the war, but some 250 still remained in Britain by the end of the Second World War in 1945.[272]


During the Civil War the Nationalist and Republican military expenditures combined totalled some $3,89bn, on average $1,44bn annually.[273] The overall Nationalist expenditures are calculated at $2,04bn, while the Republican ones reached ca. $1,85bn.[274] In comparison, in 1936-1938 the French military spendings totalled $0,87bn, the Italian ones reached $2,64bn, and the British ones stood at $4,13bn.[275] As in the mid-1930s the Spanish GDP was much smaller than the Italian, French or British ones,[276] and as in the Second Republic the annual defence and security budget was usually around $0,13bn (total annual governmental spendings were close to $0,65bn),[277] wartime military expenditures put huge strain on the Spanish economy. Financing the war posed enormous challenge for both the Nationalists and the Republicans.

The two combatant parties followed similar financial strategies; in both cases money creation, rather than new taxes or issue of debt, was key to financing the war.[278]

Both sides relied mostly on domestic resources; in case of the Nationalists they amounted to 63% of the overall spendings ($1,28bn) and in case of the Republicans they stood at 59% ($1,09bn). In the Nationalist zone money creation was responsible for some 69% of domestic resources, while in the Republican one the corresponding figure stood at 60%;[279] it was accomplished mostly by means of advances, credits, loans and debit balances from respective central banks.[280] However, while in the Nationalist zone the rising stock of money was only marginally above the production growth rate, in the Republican zone it by far exceeded dwindling production figures. The result was that while by the end of the war the Nationalist inflation was 41% compared to 1936, the Republican one was in triple digits. The second component of domestic resource was fiscal revenue. In the Nationalist zone it grew steadily and in the 2nd half of 1938 it was 214% of the figure from the 2nd half of 1936.[281]. In the Republican zone fiscal revenues in 1937 dropped to some 25% of revenues recorded in the proportional area in 1935, but recovered slightly in 1938. Neither side re-engineered the pre-war tax system; differences resulted from dramatic problems with tax collection in the Republican zone and from the course of the war, as more and more population was governed by the Nationalists. A smaller percentage of domestic resources came from expropriations, donations or internal borrowing.[282]

Foreign resources amounted to 37% in case of the Nationalists ($0,76bn) and 41% in case of the Republicans ($0,77bn).[283] For the Nationalists it was mostly the Italian and German credit;[284] in case of the Republicans it was sales of gold reserves, mostly to the USSR and in much smaller amount to France. None of the sides resolved to public borrowing and none floated debt on foreign exchange markets.[285]

Authors of recent studies suggest that given Nationalist and Republican spendings were comparable, earlier theory pointing to Republican mismanagement of resources is no longer tenable.[286] Instead, they claim that the Republicans failed to translate their resources into military victory largely because of constraints of the international non-intervention agreement; they were forced to spend in excess of market prices and accept goods of lower quality. Initial turmoil in the Republican zone contributed to problems, while at later stages the course of the war meant that population, territory and resources kept shrinking.[287]

Death toll

Civil War death toll
+1m1,500,000[289] 1,124,257,[290] 1,200,000,[291] 1,000,000[292]
+ 900,000909,000,[293] 900,000[294]
+ 800,000800,000[295]
+ 700,000750,000,[296] 745,000,[297] 700,000[298]
+ 600,000665.300,[299] 650,000,[300] 640,000,[301] 625,000,[302] 623,000,[303] 613,000,[304] 611,000,[305] 610,000,[306] 600,000[307]
+ 500,000580,000,[308] 560,000,[309] 540,000,[310] 530,000,[311] 500,000[312]
+ 400,000496,000,[313] 465,000,[314] 450,000,[315] 443,000,[316] 436,000,[317] 420,000,[318] 410,000,[319] 405,000,[320] 400,000[321]
+ 300,000380,000,[322] 365,000,[323] 350,000,[324] 346,000,[325] 344,000,[326] 335,000,[327] 330,000,[328] 310,000,[329] 300,000[330]
+ 200,000290,000,[331] 270,000,[332] 265,000,[333] 256,825,[334] 255,000,[335] 250,000,[336] 231,000[337]
+ 100,000170,489,[338] 149,213[339]

The death toll of the Spanish Civil War is far from clear and remains—especially in part related to war and postwar repression—a very controversial issue. Many general historiographic works—notably in Spain—refrain from advancing any figures; massive historical series,[340] encyclopedias[341] or dictionaries[342] provide no numbers or at best propose vague general descriptions;[343] more detailed general history accounts produced by expert Spanish scholars often remain silent on the issue.[344] Foreign scholars, especially Anglo-Saxon historians, are more eager to offer some general estimates, though some have revised their projections, usually downward,[345] and the figures vary from 1 million to 250,000. Apart from bias/ill will, incompetence or changing access to sources, the differences result chiefly from categorisation and methodology issues.

The totals advanced usually include or exclude various categories. Scholars who focus on killings or "violent deaths" most typically list (1) combat and combat-related deaths; figures in this rubric range from 100,000[346] to 700,000;[347] (2) rearguard terror, both judicial and extrajudicial, recorded until the end of the Civil War: 103,000[348] to 235,000;[349] (3) civilian deaths from military action, typically air raids: 10,000[349] to 15,000.[350] These categories combined point to totals from 235,000[351] to 715,000.[352] Many authors opt for a broader view and calculate "death toll" by adding also (4) above-the-norm deaths caused by malnutrition, hygiene shortcomings, cold, illness, etc. recorded until the end of the Civil War: 30,000[353] to 630,000.[354] It is not unusual to encounter war statistics which include (5) postwar terror related to Civil War, at times up to the year of 1961: 23,000[355] to 200,000.[349] Some authors also add (6) foreign combat and combat-related deaths: 3,000[356] to 25,000,[355] (7) Spaniards killed in World War II: 6,000,[355] (8) deaths related to postwar guerilla, typically the Valle de Arán invasion: 4,000,[355] (9) above-the-norm deaths caused by malnutrition, etc., recorded after the Civil War but related to it: 160,000[355] to 300,000.[357]

Demographers take an entirely different approach; instead of adding up deaths from different categories, they try to gauge the difference between the total number of deaths recorded during the war and the total that would result from applying annual death averages from the 1926–1935 period; this difference is considered excess death resulting from the war. The figure they arrive at for the 1936–1939 period is 346,000; the figure for 1936–1942, including the years of postwar deaths resulting from terror and war sufferings, is 540,000.[358] Some scholars go even further and calculate the war's "population loss" or "demographic impact"; in this case they might include also (10) migration abroad: 160,000[359] to 730,000[360] and 11) decrease in birth rate: 500,000[361] to 570,000.[362]


Death totals remain debated. British historian Antony Beevor wrote in his history of the Civil War that Franco's ensuing "white terror" resulted in the deaths of 200,000 people and that the "red terror" killed 38,000.[363] Julius Ruiz contends that, "Although the figures remain disputed, a minimum of 37,843 executions were carried out in the Republican zone, with a maximum of 150,000 executions (including 50,000 after the war) in Nationalist Spain".[364] Historian Michael Seidman stated that the Nationalists killed approximately 130,000 people and the Republicans approximately 50,000 people.[365]

In 2008 a Spanish judge, Baltasar Garzón, opened an investigation into the executions and disappearances of 114,266 people between 17 July 1936 and December 1951. Among the executions investigated was that of the poet and dramatist Federico García Lorca, whose body has never been found.[366] Mention of García Lorca's death was forbidden during Franco's regime.[367]

Recent research has started to locate mass graves, using a combination of witness testimony, remote sensing and forensic geophysics techniques.[368]

Historians such as Helen Graham,[369] Paul Preston,[370] Antony Beevor,[371] Gabriel Jackson[372] and Hugh Thomas[373] argue that the mass executions behind the Nationalists lines were organised and approved by the Nationalist rebel authorities, while the executions behind the Republican lines were the result of the breakdown of the Republican state and anarchy:

Though there was much wanton killing in rebel Spain, the idea of the limpieza, the "cleaning up", of the country from the evils which had overtaken it, was a disciplined policy of the new authorities and a part of their programme of regeneration. In republican Spain, most of the killing was the consequence of anarchy, the outcome of a national breakdown, and not the work of the state, although some political parties in some cities abetted the enormities, and some of those responsible ultimately rose to positions of authority.

Hugh Thomas[373]

Conversely, historian, Stanley Payne argues that the political violence in the Republican zone was in fact organized by the left:

In general, this was not an irrepressible outpouring of hatred, by the man in the street for his "oppressors", as it has sometimes been painted, but a semi-organized activity carried out by sections of nearly all the leftist groups. In the entire leftist zone the only organized political party that eschewed involvement in such activity were the Basque Nationalists.[131]


Nationalist atrocities, which authorities frequently ordered so as to eradicate any trace of "leftism" in Spain, were common. The notion of a limpieza (cleansing) formed an essential part of the rebel strategy, and the process began immediately after an area had been captured.[374] According to historian Paul Preston, the minimum number of those executed by the rebels is 130,000,[375] and is likely to have been far higher, with other historians placing the figure at 200,000 dead.[376] The violence was carried out in the rebel zone by the military, the Civil Guard and the Falange in the name of the regime.[377] Julius Ruiz reports that the Nationalists killed 100,000 people during the war and executed at least 28,000 immediately after. The first three months of the war were the bloodiest, with 50 to 70 percent of all executions carried out by Franco's regime, from 1936 to 1975, occurring during this period.[378] The first few months of killings lacked much in the way of centralisation, being largely in the hands of local commanders. Such was the extent of the killings of civilians that General Mola was taken aback by them, despite his own planning emphasising the need for violence; early in the conflict he had ordered a group of leftist militiamen to be immediately executed, only to change his mind and rescind the order.[379]

Many such acts were committed by reactionary groups during the first weeks of the war.[377] This included the execution of schoolteachers,[380] because the efforts of the Second Spanish Republic to promote laicism and displace the Church from schools by closing religious educational institutions were considered by the Nationalists as an attack on the Roman Catholic Church. Extensive killings of civilians were carried out in the cities captured by the Nationalists,[381] along with the execution of unwanted individuals. These included non-combatants such as trade-unionists, Popular Front politicians, suspected Freemasons, Basque, Catalan, Andalusian, and Galician Nationalists, Republican intellectuals, relatives of known Republicans, and those suspected of voting for the Popular Front.[377][382][383][384][385]

Nationalist forces massacred civilians in Seville, where some 8,000 people were shot; 10,000 were killed in Cordoba; 6,000–12,000 were killed in Badajoz[386] after more than one thousand of landowners and conservatives were killed by the revolutionaries. In Granada, where working-class neighborhoods were hit with artillery and right-wing squads were given free rein to kill government sympathizers,[387] at least 2,000 people were murdered.[380] In February 1937, over 7,000 were killed after the capture of Málaga.[388] When Bilbao was conquered, thousands of people were sent to prison. There were fewer executions than usual, however, because of the effect Guernica left on Nationalists' reputations internationally.[389] The numbers killed as the columns of the Army of Africa devastated and pillaged their way between Seville and Madrid are particularly difficult to calculate.[390]

Nationalists also murdered Catholic clerics. In one particular incident, following the capture of Bilbao, they took hundreds of people, including 16 priests who had served as chaplains for the Republican forces, to the countryside or graveyards and murdered them.[391][392]

Franco's forces also persecuted Protestants, including murdering 20 Protestant ministers.[393] Franco's forces were determined to remove the "Protestant heresy" from Spain.[394] The Nationalists also persecuted Basques, as they strove to eradicate Basque culture.[240] According to Basque sources, some 22,000 Basques were murdered by Nationalists immediately after the Civil War.[395]

The Nationalist side conducted aerial bombing of cities in Republican territory, carried out mainly by the Luftwaffe volunteers of the Condor Legion and the Italian air force volunteers of the Corpo Truppe Volontarie: Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Guernica, Durango, and other cities were attacked. The Bombing of Guernica was the most controversial.[396]

Michael Seidman observes that the Nationalist terror was a key part of the Nationalist victory as it allowed them to secure their rear; the Russian Whites, in their respective civil war, had struggled to suppress peasant rebellions, bandits and warlordism behind their lines; British observers argued that if the Russian Whites had been able to secure law and order behind their lines, they would have won over the peasantry, while the inability of the Chinese Nationalists to stop banditry during the Chinese Civil War did severe damage to the regime's legitimacy. The Spanish Nationalists, in contrast, imposed a puritanically terrorist order on the populace in their territory. They never suffered from serious partisan activity behind their lines and the fact that banditry did not develop into a serious problem in Spain, despite how easy it would have been in such mountainous terrain, demands explanation. Seidman argues that severe terror, combined with control of the food supply, explains the general lack of guerilla warfare in the Nationalist rear.[397]


It is estimated that between 38,000[399] and 70,000[400] civilians were killed in Republican-held territories, with the most common estimate being around 50,000.[401][402] Stanley Payne also estimates that the Republicans executed about 50,000 people.[403] Whatever the exact number, the death toll was far exaggerated by both sides, giving birth to the legend of the millón de muertos.[292] Franco's government would later give names of 61,000 victims of the red terrors, but which are not considered objectively verifiable.[404] The deaths would form the prevailing outside opinion of the republic up until the bombing of Guernica.[399]

The leftist Revolution of 1936 that preceded the war was accompanied since the first months by an escalation of leftist anticlerical terror that, between July 18 and 31 alone, killed 839 religious, continuing during the month of August with 2055 other victims, including 10 bishops killed, that was 42% of the total number of registered victims in that year.[405]

The Republican government was anticlerical, and supporters attacked and murdered Roman Catholic clergy in reaction to the news of military revolt.[392] In his 1961 book, Spanish archbishop Antonio Montero Moreno, who at the time was director of the journal Ecclesia, wrote that 6,832 were killed during the war, including 4,184 priests, 2,365 monks and friars, and 283 nuns, many were first raped before they died,[406][407] in addition to 13 bishops, a figure accepted by historians, including Beevor.[393][408][409] Some sources claim that by the conflict's end, 20 percent of the nation's clergy had been killed,[410][note 4] The "Execution" of the Sacred Heart of Jesus by Communist militiamen at Cerro de los Ángeles near Madrid, on 7 August 1936, was the most infamous of widespread desecration of religious property.[411] In dioceses where the Republicans had general control, a large proportion—often a majority—of secular priests were killed.[412] Michael Seidman argues that the hatred of the Republicans for the clergy was in excess of anything else; while local revolutionaries might spare the lives of the rich and right-wingers, they seldom offered the same to priests.[413]

Like clergy, civilians were executed in Republican territories. Some civilians were executed as suspected Falangists.[414] Others died in acts of revenge after Republicans heard of massacres carried out in the Nationalist zone.[415] Air raids committed against Republican cities were another driving factor.[416] Shopkeepers and industrialists were shot if they did not sympathise with the Republicans, and were usually spared if they did.[417] Fake justice was sought through commissions, named checas after the Soviet secret police organization.[414]

Many killings were done by paseos, impromptu death squads that emerged as a spontaneous practice amongst revolutionary activists in Republican areas. According to Seidman, the Republican government only made efforts to stop the actions of the paseos late in the war; during the first few months, the government either tolerated it or made no efforts to stop it.[413]

As pressure mounted with the increasing success of the Nationalists, many civilians were executed by councils and tribunals controlled by competing Communist and anarchist groups.[414] Some members of the latter were executed by Soviet-advised communist functionaries in Catalonia,[418] as recounted by George Orwell's description of the purges in Barcelona in 1937 in Homage to Catalonia, which followed a period of increasing tension between competing elements of the Catalan political scene. Some individuals fled to friendly embassies, which would house up to 8,500 people during the war.[415]

In the Andalusian town of Ronda, 512 suspected Nationalists were executed in the first month of the war.[418] Communist Santiago Carrillo Solares was accused of the killing of Nationalists in the Paracuellos massacre near Paracuellos de Jarama.[420] Pro-Soviet Communists committed numerous atrocities against fellow Republicans, including other Marxists: André Marty, known as the Butcher of Albacete, was responsible for the deaths of some 500 members of the International Brigades.[421] Andrés Nin, leader of the POUM (Workers' Party of Marxist Unification), and many other prominent POUM members, were murdered by the Communists, with the help of the USSR's NKVD.[422]

The Republicans also conducted their own bombing attacks on cities, such as the bombing of Cabra, and in fact conducted more indiscriminate air raids on cities than the Nationalists.[423]

Thirty-eight thousand people were killed in the Republican zone during the war, 17,000 of whom were killed in Madrid or Catalonia within a month of the coup. Whilst the Communists were forthright in their support of extrajudicial killings, much of the Republican side was appalled by the murders.[424] Azaña came close to resigning.[415] He, alongside other members of Parliament and a great number of other local officials, attempted to prevent Nationalist supporters being lynched. Some of those in positions of power intervened personally to stop the killings.[424]

Social revolution

In the anarchist-controlled areas, Aragon and Catalonia, in addition to the temporary military success, there was a vast social revolution in which the workers and peasants collectivised land and industry and set up councils parallel to the paralyzed Republican government.[425] This revolution was opposed by the Soviet-supported communists who, perhaps surprisingly, campaigned against the loss of civil property rights.[425]

As the war progressed, the government and the communists were able to exploit their access to Soviet arms to restore government control over the war effort, through diplomacy and force.[422] Anarchists and the Workers' Party of Marxist Unification (Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista, POUM) were integrated into the regular army, albeit with resistance. The POUM Trotskyists were outlawed and denounced by the Soviet-aligned Communists as an instrument of the fascists.[422] In the May Days of 1937, many thousands of anarchist and communist Republican soldiers fought for control of strategic points in Barcelona.[235]

The pre-war Falange was a small party of some 30,000–40,000 members.[426] It also called for a social revolution that would have seen Spanish society transformed by National Syndicalism.[427] Following the execution of its leader, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, by the Republicans, the party swelled in size to several hundred thousand members.[428] The leadership of the Falange suffered 60 percent casualties in the early days of the civil war, and the party was transformed by new members and rising new leaders, called camisas nuevas ("new shirts"), who were less interested in the revolutionary aspects of National Syndicalism.[429] Subsequently, Franco united all fighting groups into the Traditionalist Spanish Falange and the National Syndicalist Offensive Juntas (Spanish: Falange Española Tradicionalista de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista, FET y de las JONS).[430]

The 1930s also saw Spain become a focus for pacifist organisations, including the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the War Resisters League, and the War Resisters' International. Many people including, as they are now called, the insumisos ("defiant ones", conscientious objectors) argued and worked for non-violent strategies. Prominent Spanish pacifists, such as Amparo Poch y Gascón and José Brocca, supported the Republicans. Brocca argued that Spanish pacifists had no alternative but to make a stand against fascism. He put this stand into practice by various means, including organizing agricultural workers to maintain food supplies, and through humanitarian work with war refugees.[note 5]

Art and propaganda

Throughout the course of the Spanish Civil War, people all over the world were exposed to the goings-on and effects of it on its people not only through standard art, but also through propaganda. Motion pictures, posters, books, radio programs, and leaflets are a few examples of this media art that was so influential during the war. Produced by both nationalists and republicans, propaganda allowed Spaniards a way to spread awareness about their war all over the world. A film co-produced by famous early-twentieth century authors such as Ernest Hemingway and Lillian Hellman was used as a way to advertise Spain's need for military and monetary aid. This film, The Spanish Earth, premiered in America in July 1937. In 1938, George Orwell's Homage to Catalonia, a personal account of his experiences and observations in the war, was published in the United Kingdom. In 1939, Jean-Paul Sartre published in France a short story, "The Wall" in which he describes the last night of prisoners of war sentenced to death by shooting.

Leading works of sculpture include Alberto Sánchez Pérez's El pueblo español tiene un camino que conduce a una estrella ("The Spanish People Have a Path that Leads to a Star"), a 12.5 m monolith constructed out of plaster representing the struggle for a socialist utopia;[431] Julio González's La Montserrat, an anti-war work which shares its title with a mountain near Barcelona, is created from a sheet of iron which has been hammered and welded to create a peasant mother carrying a small child in one arm and a sickle in the other. and Alexander Calder's Fuente de mercurio (Mercury Fountain) a protest work by the American against the Nationalist forced control of Almadén and the mercury mines there.[432]

Pablo Picasso painted Guernica in 1937, taking inspiration from the bombing of Guernica, and in Leonardo da Vinci's Battle of Anghiari. Guernica, like many important Republican masterpieces, was featured at the 1937 International Exhibition in Paris. The work's size (11 ft by 25.6 ft) grabbed much attention and cast the horrors of the mounting Spanish civil unrest into a global spotlight.[433] The painting has since been heralded as an anti-war work and a symbol of peace in the 20th century.[434]

Joan Miró created El Segador (The Reaper), formally titled El campesino catalán en rebeldía (Catalan peasant in revolt), which spans some 18 feet by 12 feet[435] and depicted a peasant brandishing a sickle in the air, to which Miró commented that "The sickle is not a communist symbol. It is the reaper's symbol, the tool of his work, and, when his freedom is threatened, his weapon."[436] This work, also featured at the 1937 International Exhibition in Paris, was shipped back to the Spanish Republic's capital in Valencia following the Exhibition, but has since gone missing or has been destroyed.[435]

The Army of Africa would feature a place in propaganda on both sides, due to the complex history of the Army and Spanish colonialism in North Africa. Both sides would invent different characters of the Moorish troops, drawing on a wide range of historical symbols, cultural prejudices and racial stereotypes. The Army of Africa would be used as part of a propaganda campaign by both sides to portray the other side as foreign invaders attacking from outside the national community, while portraying their own as representing "true Spain."[437]


Economic effects

Payment for the war on both sides was very high. Monetary resources on the Republican side were completely drained from weapon acquisition. On the Nationalist side, the biggest losses came after the conflict, when they had to let Germany exploit the country's mining resources, so until the beginning of World War II they barely had the chance to make any profit.[438] Spain was devastated in many areas, with completely destroyed towns. The Spanish economy took decades to recover.


The number of civilian victims is still being discussed, with some estimating approximately 500,000 victims, while others go as high as 1,000,000.[439] These deaths were not only due to combat, but also executions, which were especially well-organised and systematic on the Nationalist side, being more disorganised on the Republican side (mainly caused by loss of control of the armed masses by the government).[440] However, the 500,000 death toll does not include deaths by malnutrition, hunger or diseases brought about by the war.

Francoist repression after the war and Republican exile

After the War, the Francoist regime initiated a repressive process against the losing side, a "cleansing" of sorts against anything or anyone associated with the Republic. This process led many to exile or death. Exile happened in three waves. The first one was during the Northern Campaign (March–November 1937), followed by a second wave after the fall of Catalonia (January–February 1939), in which about 400,000 people fled to France. The French authorities had to improvise concentration camps, with such hard conditions that almost half of the exiled Spaniards returned. The third wave occurred after the War, at the end of March 1939, when thousands of Republicans tried to board ships to exile, although few succeeded.[441]

International relations

The political and emotional repercussions of the War transcended the National scale, becoming a precursor to World War II.[442] The war has frequently been described as the "prelude to" or the "opening round of" the Second World War, as part of an international battle against fascism. However Stanley Payne suggests this isn't accurate, arguing that the international alliance that was created in December 1941, once the United States entered WW2, was politically much broader than the Spanish Popular Front as it included conservative capitalist states such as Great Britain and the United States; indeed it included the equivalent of many forces on Franco's side. The Spanish Civil War, Payne argues, was thus a much more clear-cut revolutionary/counterrevolutionary battle between the left and right, while the Second World War initially had the fascists and communists on the same side with the Nazi-Soviet invasion of Eastern Europe. Payne suggests that instead the civil war was the last of the revolutionary crisis that emerged from the First World War, observing it had parallels such as: (1) the complete revolutionary breakdown of domestic institutions, (2) the development of full-scale revolutionary/counterrevolutionary war, (3) development of a typical post-World War One Red Army in the form of the People's Army, (4) an extreme exacerbation of nationalism, (5) frequent use of World War One style military material and concepts and (6) the fact that it was not the product of the plan of any the major powers, making it more similar to the post-First World War crises.[443][444]

After the War, Spanish policy leaned heavily towards Germany, Portugal and Italy, since they had been the greatest Nationalist supporters and aligned with Spain ideologically. However, the end of the Civil War and later the Second World War saw the isolation of the country from most other nations until the 1950s, in which the American anti-Communist international policy favoured having a far-right and extremely anti-communist ally in Europe.[445]


1868Overthrow of Queen Isabella II of the House of Bourbon
1873Isabella's replacement, King Amadeo I of the House of Savoy, abdicates throne beginning the short-lived First Spanish Republic
1874(December) Restoration of the Bourbons
1909Tragic Week in Barcelona
1923Military coup brings Miguel Primo de Rivera to power
1930(January) Miguel Primo de Rivera resigns
1931(12 April) Municipal elections, King Alfonso XIII abdicates.
1931(14 April) Second Spanish Republic is formed with Niceto Alcala-Zamora as President and Head of State
1931(June) Elections return large majority of Republicans and Socialists
1931(October) Republican Manuel Azaña becomes prime minister of a minority government
1931(December) New reformist, liberal, and democratic constitution is declared
1932(August) Unsuccessful uprising by General José Sanjurjo
1933Beginning of the "black two years"
1934Asturias uprising
1936(April) Popular Front alliance wins election and Azaña replaces Zamora as president
1936(14 April) During a military parade commemorating the 5 years of the second republic, Guardia Civil lieutenant Anastasio de los Reyes is shot in the back by anarchist/socialist agitators. Riots break out at the funeral
1936(12 June) Prime Minister Casares Quiroga meets General Juan Yagüe
1936(5 July) Aircraft chartered to take Franco from the Canary Islands to Morocco
1936(12 July) Assault Guard Lieutenant Jose Castillo is murdered after he violently put down the riots that broke out at the funeral of Guardia Civil lieutenant Anastasio de los Reyes
1936(13 July) Opposition leader Jose Calvo Sotelo is arrested and murdered by the socialist Assault Guards (Guardia de Asalto), freemason police officer Burillo also blamed.
1936(14 July) Franco arrives in Morocco
1936(17 July) Military coup gains control over Spanish Morocco
1936(17 July) Official beginning of the war
1936(20 July) Coup leader Sanjurjo is killed in a plane crash
1936(21 July) Nationalists capture the central Spanish naval base
1936(7 August) "Execution" of the Sacred Heart of Jesus by Communist militiamen at Cerro de los Angeles in Getafe
1936(4 September) The Republican government under Giral resigns, and is replaced by a mostly Socialist organization under Largo Caballero
1936(5 September) Nationalists take Irun
1936(15 September) Nationalists take San Sebastian
1936(21 September) Franco chosen as chief military commander at Salamanca
1936(27 September) Franco's troops relieve the Alcazar in Toledo
1936(29 September) Franco proclaims himself Caudillo
1936(17 October) Nationalists from Galicia relieve the besieged town of Oviedo
1936(November) Bombing of Madrid
1936(8 November) Franco launches major assault on Madrid that is unsuccessful
1936(6 November) Republican government is forced to move to Valencia from Madrid
1937Nationalists capture most of Spain's northern coastline
1937(6 February) Battle of Jarama begins
1937(8 February) Malaga falls to Franco's forces
1937(March) War in the North begins
1937(8 March) Battle of Guadalajara begins
1937(26 April) Bombing of Guernica
1937(21 May) 4,000 Basque children taken to the UK
1937(3 June) Mola, Franco's second-in-command, is killed
1937(July) Republicans move to recapture Segovia
1937(6 July) Battle of Brunete begins
1937(August) Franco invades Aragon and takes the city of Santander
1937(24 August) Battle of Belchite begins
1937(October) Gijon falls to Franco's troops
1937(November) Republican government forced to move to Barcelona from Valencia
1938Nationalists capture large parts of Catalonia
1938(January) Battle of Teruel, conquered by Republicans
1938(22 February) Franco recovers Teruel
1938(7 March) Nationalists launch the Aragon Offensive
1938(16 March) Bombing of Barcelona
1938(May) Republican sue for peace, Franco demands unconditional surrender
1938(24 July) Battle of the Ebro begins
1938(24 December) Franco throws massive force into invasion of Catalonia
1939Beginning of Franco's rule
1939(15 January) Tarragona falls to Franco
1939(26 January) Barcelona falls to Franco
1939(2 February) Girona falls to Franco
1939(27 February) UK and France recognize the Franco regime
1939(6 March) Prime minister Juan Negrin flees to France
1939(28 March) Nationalists occupy Madrid
1939(31 March) Nationalists control all Spanish territory
1939(1 April) Last Republican forces surrender in Alicante
1939(1 April) Official ending of the war
1975Ending of Franco's rule with his death on 20 November in La Paz hospital, Madrid, and Juan Carlos I of Spain becomes King of Spain

Political parties and organisations

See also


  1. From 1936 until it surrendered in 1937 to the Italian Corpo Truppe Volontarie in the Santoña Agreement.
  2. The only party under Francisco Franco from 1937 onward, a merger of the other factions on the Nationalist side.
  3. 1936–1937, then merged into FET y de las JONS
  1. See Death toll section.
  2. Also known as The Crusade (Spanish: La Cruzada) among Nationalists, the Fourth Carlist War (Spanish: Cuarta Guerra Carlista) among Carlists, and The Rebellion (Spanish: La Rebelión) or Uprising (Spanish: Sublevación) among Republicans.
  3. Westwell (2004) gives a figure of 500 million Reichmarks.
  4. Since Beevor (2006, p. 82) suggests 7,000 members of some 115,000 clergy were killed, the proportion could well be lower.
  5. See variously: Bennett, Scott, Radical Pacifism: The War Resisters League and Gandhian Nonviolence in America, 1915–1963, Syracuse NY, Syracuse University Press, 2003; Prasad, Devi, War Is a Crime Against Humanity: The Story of War Resisters' International, London, WRI, 2005. Also see Hunter, Allan, White Corpsucles in Europe, Chicago, Willett, Clark & Co., 1939; and Brown, H. Runham, Spain: A Challenge to Pacifism, London, The Finsbury Press, 1937.



  1. "Republican Army in Spain".
  2. Larrazáhal, R. Salas. "Aspectos militares de la Guerra Civil española".
  3. Thomas (1961). p. 491.
  4. The Nationalist Army
  5. Warships of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939)
  6. Thomas (1961). p. 488.
  7. Sandler, Stanley (2002). Ground Warfare: An International Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. p. 160. ISBN 9781576073445.
  8. Manuel Álvaro Dueñas, 2009, p. 126.
  9. Casanova 1999
  10. Juliá, Santos (1999). Un siglo de España. Política y sociedad. Madrid: Marcial Pons. ISBN 84-9537903-1. Fue desde luego lucha de clases por las armas, en la que alguien podía morir por cubrirse la cabeza con un sombrero o calzarse con alpargatas los pies, pero no fue en menor medida guerra de religión, de nacionalismos enfrentados, guerra entre dictadura militar y democracia republicana, entre revolución y contrarrevolución, entre fascismo y comunismo.
  11. Bowers, Claude G. (30 November 2019). My Mission to Spain. Watching the Rehearsal for World War II. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
  12. Beevor 2006, p. 43.
  13. Preston 2006, p. 84.
  14. Payne 1973, pp. 200–203.
  15. "Refugees and the Spanish Civil War | History Today".
  16. Beevor (2006). p. 88.
  17. Beevor (2006). pp. 86–87.
  18. Beevor (2006). pp. 260–271.
  19. Julius Ruiz. El Terror Rojo (2011). pp. 200–211.
  20. Beevor 2006, p. 7.
  21. Beevor 2006, p. 19.
  22. Thomas (1961). p. 13.
  23. Preston (2006). p. 21.
  24. Preston (2006). p. 22.
  25. Preston (2006). p. 24.
  26. Fraser (1979). pp. 38–39.
  27. Preston (2006). pp. 24–26.
  28. Thomas (1961). p. 15.
  29. Preston (2006). pp. 32–33.
  30. Beevor 2006, p. 15.
  31. Thomas (1961). p. 16.
  32. Beevor (2006) pp. 20–22.
  33. Beevor 2006, p. 20.
  34. Beevor 2006, p. 23.
  35. Preston 2006, pp. 38–39.
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  267. "The Roman salute characteristic of Italian fascism was first adopted by the PNE and the JONS, later spreading to the Falange and other extreme right groups, before it became the official salute in Franco's Spain. The JAP salute, which consisted of stretching the right arm horizontally to touch the left shoulder enjoyed only relatively little acceptance. The gesture of the raised fist, so widespread among left-wing workers' groups, gave rise to more regimented variations, such as the salute with the fist on one's temple, characteristic of the German Rotfront, which was adopted by the republican Popular Army". The Splintering of Spain, pp. 36–37
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  273. the war lasted 986 days; dollars are quoted at their nominal value of the late 1930s
  274. Martin-Acena Pablo, Martinez Ruiz Elena, Pons Brias María (2010), War and Economics: Spanish Civil War Finances Revisited, [in:] MPRA Paper 22833, p. 25
  275. Maier Charles S. (1987), In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy, ISBN 9780521346986, p. 105
  276. in the mid-1930s the Spanish GDP was 23% of the British one, 37% of the French one and 48% of the Italian one, see e.g. Maddison Angus, Historical Statistics of the World Economy, available here
  277. in 1934 the Spanish military spendings as reported by the statistical office were 958m ptas; in 1935 they were 1,065m ptas, Huerta Barajas Justo Alberto (2016), Gobierno u administración militar en la II República Española, ISBN 9788434023031, p. 805. The peseta to dolar exchange rate for 1935 varied from 7,32 in August to 7,38 in January, Martínez Méndez P. (1990), Nuevos datos sobre la evolución de la peseta entre 1900 y 1936, ISBN 8477930724, p. 14
  278. Martin-Acena, Martinez Ruiz, Pons Brias 2010, p. 1
  279. Martin-Acena, Martinez Ruiz, Pons Brias 2010, p. 11
  280. Martin-Acena, Martinez Ruiz, Pons Brias 2010, pp. 11-12
  281. in nominal terms, in terms of purchasing power the growth was smaller; nominal figures were 396m ptas in the 2nd half of 1936 and 847m ptas in the 2nd half of 1938, Martin-Acena, Martinez Ruiz, Pons Brias 2010, p. 10
  282. Martin-Acena, Martinez Ruiz, Pons Brias 2010, pp. 7-11
  283. when assessing financial cost of waging the war, some scholars limit their analysis to foreign resources only and set expenditures of both sides at some $0,7bn each, compare e.g. Romero Salvado, Francisco J. (2013), Historical Dictionary of the Spanish Civil War, ISBN 9780810857841, p. 20. Similarly, another author claims that "the republican authorities obtained 714 million dollars, and this was the financial cost of the civil war for the Republicans", while "the financial cost of the war on the Francoist side was very similar, between 694 and 716 million dollars", Casanova, Julian (2013), The Spanish Civil War, ISBN 9781848856578, p. 91. The same author claims in the same work that "losing the war cost the Republic almost as much as Franco spent on winning it, some six hundred million dollars on each side" (p. 185)
  284. exact figures differ; one source claims $0,45bn for Italy and $0,23bn for Germany, Romero Salvado 2013, p. 20; the rest was mostly private credit from British (e.g. Rio Tinto) or US (e.g. Texaco) companies
  285. Martin-Acena, Martinez Ruiz, Pons Brias 2010, pp. 11-14
  286. earlier studies suggested that the Republican military expenditures were 4 times larger than the Nationalist ones (40bn ptas v. 12bn ptas); the conclusion drawn was that the Republicans have grossly mismanaged their resources. Recent studies claim that the above figures are calculated in nominal terms, and that entirely different picture emerges when inflation and exchange rates are taken into account, Martin-Acena, Martinez Ruiz, Pons Brias 2010, pp. 2-3
  287. Martin-Acena, Martinez Ruiz, Pons Brias 2010, pp. 25-26
  288. highest considered estimate; "la guerra civil fue una espantosa calamidad en la que todas las clases y todos los partidos perdieron. Además del millión o dos milliones de muertos, la salud del pueblo se ha visto minada por su secuela de hambre y enfermedades", Brennan, Gerald (1978), El laberinto español. Antecedentes sociales y políticos de la guerra civil, ISBN 978-8485361038, p. 20
  289. some press estimates from the era, see e.g. "one and a half million Spaniards have already been killed in the war", Spain's War Goes On, [in:] Daily Record [Britain] March 28, 1939
  290. initial estimate of Ramón Salas Larrazábal, El mito del millón de muertos, includes victims of malnutrition, cold etc, includes birth deficit assumed to be caused by the war
  291. "esta cruenta lucha le costó a España 1 200 000 muertos entre combatientes y civiles", Pazos Beceiro, Carlos (2004), La globalización económica neoliberal y la guerra, ISBN 9789597071266, p. 116
  292. Lee, Stephen J. (2000), European Dictatorships, 1918–1945, ISBN 978-0415230452, p. 248; "a reasonable estimate, and a rather conservative one", Howard Griffin, John, Simon, Yves René (1974), Jacques Maritain: Homage in Words and Pictures, ISBN 978-0873430463, p. 11; military casualties only, Ash, Russell (2003), The Top 10 of Everything 2004, ISBN 978-0789496591, p. 68; lowest considered estimate, Brennan (1978), p. 20. The phrase of "one million dead" became a cliche since the 1960s, and many older Spaniards might repeat that "yo siempre había escuchado lo del millon de muertos", compare burbuja service, available here. This is so due to extreme popularity of a 1961 novel Un millón de muertos by José María Gironella, even though the author many times declared that he had in mind those "muerto espiritualmente", referred after Diez Nicolas, Juan (1985), La mortalidad en la Guerra Civil Española, [in:] Boletín de la Asociación de Demografía Histórica III/1, p. 42. Scholars claim also that the figure of "one million deaths" was continuously repeated by Francoist authorities "to drive home the point of having saved the country form ruin", Encarnación, Omar G. (2008), Spanish Politics: Democracy After Dictatorship, ISBN 978-0745639925, p. 24, and became one of the "mitos principales del franquismo", referred as "myth no. 9" in Reig Tapia, Alberto (2017), La crítica de la crítica: Inconsecuentes, insustanciales, impotentes, prepotentes y equidistantes, ISBN 978-8432318658
  293. 145,000 KIA, 134,000 executed, 630,000 due to sickness, cold etc., Guerre civile d'Espagne, [in:] Encyclopedie Larousse online, available here
  294. Nadeau, Jean-Benoit, Barlow, Julie (2013), The Story of Spanish, ISBN 978-1250023162, p. 283
  295. maximum considered estimate, Griffin, Julia Ortiz, Griffin, William D. (2007), Spain and Portugal: A Reference Guide from the Renaissance to the Present, ISBN 978-0816074761, p. 49, "[war] generated around 800,000 deaths", Laia Balcells (2011), Death is in the Air: Bombings in Catalonia, 1936–1939, [in:] Reis 136, p. 199
  296. "the war cost about 750,000 Spanish lives", A Dictionary of World History (2006), ISBN 978-0192807007, p. 602; also "la poblacion de Espana en 1939 contaba 750,000 personas menos que las esperables si no hubiera habido guerra", ¿Cuántas víctimas se cobró la Guerra Civil? ¿Dónde hubo más?, [in:] El Pais 27.02.2019 [accessed December 7, 2019]
  297. Coatsworth, John, Cole, Juan, Hanagan, Michael P., Perdue, Peter C., Tilly, Charles, Tilly, Louise (2015), Global Connections, ISBN 978-0521761062, p. 379; divided into 700,000 died "in battle", 30,000 executed and 15,000 of air raids, Dupuy, R. Ernest, Dupuy, Trevor N. (1977), The Encyclopedia of Military History, ISBN 0060111399, p. 1032, the same breakdown in The Encyclopedia of World History (2001), ISBN 978-0395652374, p. 692, and in Teed, Peter (1992),A Dictionary of Twentieth-Century History, ISBN 0192852078, p. 439
  298. 600,000 killed during the war + 100,000 executed afterwards, Tucker, Spencer C. (2016), World War II: The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection, ISBN 978-1851099696, p. 1563; Georges Soria, Guerra y Revolucion en Espana (1936–1939), vol. 5, Barcelona 1978, p. 87
  299. Jeanes, Ike (1996), Forecast and Solution: Grappling with the Nuclear, a Trilogy for Everyone, ISBN 978-0936015620, p. 131
  300. Del Amo, Maria (2006), Cuando La Higuera Este Brotando..., ISBN 978-1597541657, p. 28
  301. when referring reported calculations of Hugh Thomas and divided into 320,000 KIA, 100,000 executed and 220,000 of malnutrition etc., Crow, John Armstrong (1985), Spain: The Root and the Flower : an Interpretation of Spain and the Spanish People, ISBN 978-0520051331, p. 342
  302. highest considered estimate, Tusell, Javier (1998), Historia de España en el siglo XX. Tomo III. La Dictadura de Franco, ISBN 8430603328, p. 625
  303. including war-related executions until 1961, death above average due to illness etc., Salas Larrazabal, Ramón (1977), Pérdidas de la guerra, ISBN 8432002852, pp. 428–429
  304. including 285,000 KIA, 125,000 civilians "due to war directed causes", 200,000 malnutrition., Sandler, Stanley (2002), Ground Warfare: An International Encyclopedia, vol. 1, ISBN 978-1576073445, p. 160
  305. Nash, Jay Robert (1976), Darkest Hours, ISBN 978-1590775264, p. 775
  306. 285,000 in combat, 125,000 executed, 200,000 of malnutrition, Thomas, Hugh (1961), The Spanish Civil War (and other initial editions), referred after Clodfelter, Micheal (2017), Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492–2015, ISBN 978-0786474707, p. 339
  307. "at least" and "between 1936 and 1945", includes 300,000 "combatants", Salvadó, Francisco Romero (2013), Historical Dictionary of the Spanish Civil War, ISBN 978-0810880092, p. 21
  308. 100,000 in combat, 220,000 rearguard terror, 10,000 in air raids, 200,000 after-war terror, 50,000 malnutrition etc.; Jackson, Gabriel (1965), The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931–1939, ISBN 978-0691007571, referred after Clodfelter (2017), p. 338
  309. Gallo, Max (1974), Spain under Franco: a history, ISBN 978-0525207504, p. 70; divided into 345,000 during the war and 215,000 in 1939–1942, Diez Nicolas (1985), pp. 52–53
  310. delta between the total number of deaths recorded in 1936–1942 and the total which would have resulted from extrapolating average annual death total from the 1926–1935 period, Ortega, José Antonio, Silvestre, Javier (2006), Las consecuencias demográficas, [in:] Aceńa, Pablo Martín (ed.), La economía de la guerra civil, ISBN 978-8496467330, p. 76
  311. excluding "50,000 more fatalities in Franco's prison camps during the immediate postwar period", Smele, Jonathan D. (2015), Historical Dictionary of the Russian Civil Wars, 1916–1926, ISBN 978-1442252813, p. 253
  312. approximate, excluding post-war terror; Hepworth, Andrea (2017), Site of memory and dismemory: the Valley of the Fallen in Spain, [in:] Gigliotti, Simone, The Memorialization of Genocide, ISBN 978-1317394167, p. 77; highest considered estimate, Seidman, Michael (2011), The Victorious Counterrevolution: The Nationalist Effort in the Spanish Civil War, ISBN 978-0299249632, p. 172; Britannica Concise Encyclopedia (2008), ISBN 978-1593394929, p. 1795; 200,000 in combat, 125,000 executed, 175,000 of malnutrition, Thomas, Hugh (1977), The Spanish Civil War (and later editions), referred after Clodfelter (2017), p. 339; Nowa encyklopedia powszechna PWN (1995), vol. 2, ISBN 830111097X, p. 778; "probably over.." and including 300,000 KIA, Palmer, Alan (1990), Penguin Dictionary of Twentieth-Century History, ISBN 0140511881, p. 371; KIA + victims of terror only, Lowe, Norman (2013), Mastering modern history, London 2013, ISBN 978-1137276940, p. 345; at least, "lost their lives", Palmowski, Jan (2008), The Dictionary of Contemporary World History, ISBN 978-0199295678, p. 643
  313. 215,000 in combat, 200,000 killed in rearguard, 70,000 due to wartime hardships, 11,000 civilian victims of military operations; the author later rounds up the total to 0,5m, Alonso Millán, Jesús (2015), La guerra total en España (1936–1939), ISBN 978-1512174137, pp. 403–404
  314. at most 300,000 "violent deaths" + 165,000 above average deaths, Payne, Stanley G. (1987), The Franco Regime, ISBN 978-0299110741, pp. 219–220
  315. highest considered estimate, Du Souich, Felipe (2011), Apuntes de Historia de Espana Para Los Amigos, ISBN 978-1447527336, p. 62; "at least", "killed", Quigley, Caroll (2004), Tragedy and Hope. A History of the World in our Time, ISBN 094500110X, p. 604.
  316. De Miguel, Amando (1987), Significación demográfica de la guerra civil, [in:] Santos Juliá Díaz (ed.), Socialismo y guerra civil, ISBN 8485691350, p. 193.
  317. Kirsch, Hans-Christian (1967), Der spanische Bürgerkrieg in Augenzeugenberichten, p. 446
  318. 200,000 KIA, 200,000 executed, 20,000 executed after the war, excluding "unknown numbers" of civilians killed in military action and "many more" died of malnutrition etc., Preston, Paul (2012), The Spanish holocaust, ISBN 978-0393239669, p. xi
  319. Batchelor, Dawho hn (2011), The Mystery on Highway 599, ISBN 978-1456734756, p. 57
  320. highest considered estimate, Jackson, Gabriel (2005), La Republica Espanola y la Guerra Civil, ISBN 8447336336, p. 14
  321. Chislett, William (2013), Spain: What Everyone Needs to Know?, ISBN 978-0199936458, p. 42; "probably", Spielvogel, Jackon J. (2013), Western Civilization: A Brief History, ISBN 978-1133606765, p. 603; Mourre, Michel (1978), Dictionaire Encyclopedique d'Histoire, vol. 3, ISBN 204006513X, p. 1636; broken down into 200,000 KIA and 200,000 executed, Bradford, James. C (2006), International Encyclopedia of Military History, vol. 2, ISBN 0415936616, p. 1209; lowest considered estimate, Tusell, Javier (1998), Historia de España en el siglo XX. Tomo III. La Dictadura de Franco, ISBN 8430603328, p. 625
  322. highest considered estimate, Bowen, Wayne H. (2006), Spain During World War II, ISBN 978-0826265159, p. 113
  323. White, Matthew (2011), Atrocitology: Humanity's 100 Deadliest Achievements, ISBN 978-0857861252, p. LXIX; broken down into 200,000 KIA, 130,000 executed, 25,000 of malnutrition and 10,000 of air raids, Johnson, Paul (1984), A History of the Modern World, ISBN 0297784757, p. 339
  324. Julia, Santos, (1999), Victimas de la guerra, ISBN 978-8478809837, referred after Richards, Michael (2006), El régimen de Franco y la política de memoria de la guerra civil española, [in:] Aróstegui, Julio, Godicheau, François (eds.), Guerra Civil: mito y memoria, ISBN 978-8496467125, p. 173; Richards, Michael (2013), After the Civil War: Making Memory and Re-Making Spain Since 1936, ISBN 978-0521899345, p. 6; Renshaw, Layla (2016), Exhuming Loss: Memory, Materiality and Mass Graves of the Spanish Civil War, ISBN 978-1315428680, p. 22
  325. delta between the total number of deaths recorded in 1936–1939 and the total which would have resulted from extrapolating average annual death total from the 1926–1935 period, Ortega, Silvestre (2006), p. 76
  326. does not include post-war losses, Payne, Stanley G. (2012), The Spanish Civil War, ISBN 978-0521174701, p. 245
  327. lowest considered estimate, includes 150,000 KIA and 185,000 victims of rearguard repression, Bernecker, Walter L. (ed., 2008), Spanien heute: Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur, ISBN 978-3865274182, p. 109
  328. lowest considered estimate, Du Souich (2011), p. 62; lowest considered estimate, Jackson (2005), p. 14; 1943 estimate of the Spanish Direccion General de Estadistica, referred after Puche, Javier (2017), Economia, mercado y bienestar humano durante la Guerra Civil Espanola, [in:] Contenciosa V/7, p. 13
  329. Pedro Montoliú Camps (1998), Madrid en la guerra civil: La historia, ISBN 978-8477370727, p. 324
  330. "at least", Hart, Stephen M. (1998), "!No Pasarán!": Art, Literature and the Spanish Civil War, ISBN 978-0729302869, p. 16, Preston, Paul (2003), The Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Military in 20th-century Spain, ISBN 978-1134811137, p. 40; lowest considered estimate, Seidman, Michael (2011), The Victorious Counterrevolution: The Nationalist Effort in the Spanish Civil War, ISBN 978-0299249632, p. 172; Camps, Pedro Montoliú (2005), Madrid en la Posguerra, ISBN 978-8477371595, p. 375, "at most", excluding deaths from malnutrition etc., The New Encyclopædia Britannica (2017), vol. 11, ISBN 978-1593392925, p. 69; of which 140,000 in combat, Большая Российская энциклопедия, (2008), vol. 12, ISBN 978-5852703439, p. 76
  331. highest considered estimate, 150,000 in combat and 140,000 executed, Moa, Pio (2015), Los mitos del franquismo, ISBN 978-8490603741, p. 44
  332. "at least", Hitchcock, William L. (2008), The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent 1945 to the Present, ISBN 978-0307491404, p. 271
  333. 100,000 in combat, 135,000 executed, 30,000 other causes,. Muñoz, Miguel A. (2009), Reflexiones en torno a nuestro pasado, ISBN 978-8499231464, p. 375
  334. "muertos a causa de la Guerra", includes victims of post-war terror. The figure is based on totals reported as "violent deaths" in the official statistics for 1936–1942 and calculated by Ramón Tamames, Breve historia de la Guerra Civil espanola, Barcelona 2011, ISBN 978-8466650359, chapter "Impactos demograficos" (page unavailable). Tamames suggests that the actual number of victims is probably much higher than this given by official statistics
  335. lowest considered estimate, 145,000 in combat and 110,000 executed, Moa (2015), p. 44
  336. lowest considered estimate, Bowen (2006), p. 113
  337. 103,000 executed during the war, 28,000 executed afterwards, around 100,000 KIA, Martínez de Baños Carrillo, Fernando, Szafran, Agnieszka (2011), El general Walter, ISBN 978-8492888061, p. 324
  338. the total reported as "muerte violenta o casual" for 1936–1939 in official statistics released by Instituto Nacional de Estadistica in 1943, might include accidental deaths (car accidents etc.) and covers all months of 1936 and 1939, excludes "homicidio" category (39,028 for 1936–1939), referred after Diez Nicolas (1985), p. 54
  339. the number which emerges from the official statistics as provided during the early Francoist era and calculated later by Ramón Tamames, who analyses the figures released in 1951 by Instituto Nacional de Estadistica. Tamames added figures reported in the "violent deaths" rubric for 1936, 1937 and 1938 and 25% of the same category for 1939; then he deducted annual averages for "violent deaths" reported by INE in the mid-1930s to arrive at 149,213. Tamames suggests that the actual figure is probably "mucho mayor", Tamames (2011)
  340. see e.g. the monumental Historia de España Menéndez Pidal, (2005), vol. XL, ISBN 8467013060
  341. Encyclopedia de Historia de España (1991), vol. 5, ISBN 8420652415
  342. Diccionario Espasa Historia de España y América (2002), ISBN 8467003162
  343. "provocó un número de caidós en combate sin precedentes, casi tantos como los muertos y desaparecidos en la retaguardia", Diccionario de historia y política del siglo XX (2001), ISBN 843093703X, p. 316, "habia comportado centenares de miles de muertos", Marín, José María, Ysàs, Carme Molinero (2001), Historia política de España, 1939–2000, vol. 2, ISBN 978-8470903199, p. 17
  344. Tusell, Javier, Martín, José Luis, Shaw, Carlos (2001), Historia de España: La edad contemporánea, vol. 2, ISBN 978-8430604357, Pérez, Joseph (1999), Historia de España, ISBN 978-8474238655, Tusell, Javier (2007), Historia de España en el siglo XX, vol. 2, ISBN 978-8430606306
  345. e.g. Stanley G. Payne reduced his earlier estimate of 465,000 (at most 300,000 "violent deaths" with 165,000 deaths from malnutrition which "must be added", Payne (1987), p. 220) to 344,000 (also "violent deaths" and malnutrition victims, Payne (2012), p. 245); Hugh Thomas in The Spanish Civil War editions from the 1960s opted for 600,000 (285,000 KIA, 125,000 executed, 200,000 malnutrition), in editions from the 1970s he reduced the figure to 500,000 (200,000 KIA, 125,000 executed, 175,000 malnutrition), referred after Clodfeler (2017), p. 383 and with slight revisions kept reproducing the figure also in last editions published before his death, compare Thomas, Hugh (2003), La Guerra Civil Española, vol. 2, ISBN 8497598229, p. 993; Gabriel Jackson went down from 580,000 (including 420,000 victims of war and post-war terror), see Jackson (1965) to a range of 405,000–330,000 (including 220,000 to 170,000 victims of war and post-war terror), Jackson (2005), p. 14
  346. Jackson (1965), p. 412, Muñoz (2009), p. 375
  347. Dupuy, Dupuy (1977), p. 1032, Teed (1992), 439
  348. Martínez de Baños, Szafran (2011), p. 324
  349. Jackson (1965), p. 412
  350. Dupuy, Dupuy (1977), p. 1032
  351. Moa (2015), p. 44
  352. Tucker (2016), p. 1563,
  353. Muñoz (2009), p. 375
  354. Guerre civile d'Espagne, [in:] Encyclopedie Larousse online, available here
  355. Larrazabal (1977), pp. 428–429
  356. Sandler (2002), p. 160
  357. highest considered estimate, Payne (2012), p. 245
  358. Ortega, Silvestre (2006), p. 76; slightly different figures, 344,000 and 558,000, in earlier study completed using the same method, see Diez Nicolas (1985), p. 48.
  359. only those who did not return to Spain, Payne (1987), p. 220.
  360. Ortega, Silvestre (2006), p. 80; the number of migrants usually quoted is 450,000, which refers only to these who crossed to France in the first months of 1939, López, Fernando Martínez (2010), París, ciudad de acogida: el exilio español durante los siglos XIX y XX, ISBN 978-8492820122, p. 252.
  361. "a deficit of approximately a half million births resulted", Payne (1987), p. 218.
  362. delta between actual birth totals for 1936–1942 and birth totals which would have resulted from extrapolating average annual birth totals from the 1926–1935 period, Ortega, Silvestre (2006), p. 67.
  363. "Men of La Mancha". The Economist. 22 June 2006. Retrieved 3 August 2011.
  364. Ruiz, Julius (2007). "Defending the Republic: The García Atadell Brigade in Madrid, 1936". Journal of Contemporary History. 42 (1): 97. doi:10.1177/0022009407071625.
  365. Seidman, Michael. Transatlantic Antifascisms: From the Spanish Civil War to the End of World War II. Cambridge University Press, 2017, p-18
  366. "Spanish judge opens case into Franco's atrocities". The New York Times. 16 October 2008. Retrieved 28 July 2009.
  367. Beevor (2006), p. 92.
  368. Fernández-Álvarez, José-Paulino; Rubio-Melendi, David; Martínez-Velasco, Antxoka; Pringle, Jamie K.; Aguilera, Hector-David (2016). "Discovery of a mass grave from the Spanish Civil War using Ground Penetrating Radar and forensic archaeology". Forensic Science International. 267: e10–e17. doi:10.1016/j.forsciint.2016.05.040. PMID 27318840.
  369. Graham (2005). p. 30.
  370. Preston (2006), p. 307.
  371. Beevor (2006). pp. 86–87.
  372. Jackson (1967), p. 305.
  373. Thomas (2001), p. 268.
  374. Beevor 2006, p. 98.
  375. Preston, Paul (19 January 2008). "Paul Preston lecture: The Crimes of Franco" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 7 February 2011. Retrieved 16 August 2011.
  376. Beevor 2006, p. 94.
  377. Beevor (2006). pp. 88–89.
  378. Juliuz Ruiz, Franco's Peace, in Quigley, Paul, and James Hawdon, eds. Reconciliation After Civil Wars: Global Perspectives. Routledge, 2018.
  379. Payne, Stanley G., and Jesús Palacios. Franco: A personal and political biography. University of Wisconsin Pres, 2014, p.202
  380. Beevor (2006). p. 89.
  381. Preston (2007). p. 121.
  382. Jackson (1967). p. 377.
  383. Thomas (2001). pp. 253–255.
  384. Santos et al. (1999). p. 229.
  385. Preston (2006). pp. 120–123.
  386. Beevor (2006). p. 91.
  387. Balfour, Sebastian. "Spain from 1931 to the Present". Spain: a History. Ed. Raymond Carr. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 257. Print.
  388. Beevor (2006). p. 93.
  389. Beevor (2006). pp. 236–237.
  390. Preston (2006). p. 302.
  391. Bieter, Bieter (2003). p. 91.
  392. Beevor (2006). pp. 82–83.
  393. Beevor (2006). p. 82.
  394. Seidman (2011). p. 205.
  395. Wieland (2002). p. 47.
  396. Westwell (2004). p. 31.
  397. Seidman, Michael. "The Victorious Counterrevolution." The Nationalist Effort in the (2011), p.30-31
  398. Juan E. Pflüger (18 July 2015). "Martirio y asesinato de las 27 Hermanas Adoratrices". La Gaceta (Spain).
  399. Beevor (2006). p. 81.
  400. Cueva, Julio de la, "Religious Persecution", Journal of Contemporary History, 3, 198, pp. 355-369. JSTOR 261121
  401. Thomas, Hugh. The Spanish Civil War. Penguin Books. 2001. London. p. 900
  402. Preston, Paul. The Spanish Civil War. Reaction, revolution & revenge. Harper Perennial. 2006. London. p.233
  403. Payne, The Spanish Civil War, 2012, pp.244-245; Espinosa (ed.), Violencia roja y azul, 77-78. Díaz (ed.), Víctimas de la guerra civil, 411-412.
  404. "Chapter 26: A History of Spain and Portugal vol. 2".
  405. Alfonso Alvarez Bolado (28 February 1996). Para ganar la guerra, para ganar la paz. Iglesia y Guerra Civil (1936-1939) (Estudios). ASIN 8487840795.
  406. Antonio Montero Moreno (1998). Historia de la persecución religiosa de España 1936 - 1939. Biblioteca de autores cristianos.
  407. Santos Juliá; Josep M. Solé; Joan Vilarroya; Julián Casanova (1999). Víctimas de la guerra civil. Ediciones Martínez Roca. p. 58.
  408. Antonio Montero Moreno, Historia de la persecucion religiosa en Espana 1936–1939 (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1961)
  409. Payne (1973). p. 649.
  410. Bowen (2006). p. 22.
  411. Ealham, Richards (2005). pp. 80, 168.
  412. Hubert Jedin; John Dolan (1981). History of the Church. Continuum. p. 607. ISBN 978-0-86012-092-6.
  413. Seidman, Michael. Transatlantic Antifascisms: From the Spanish Civil War to the End of World War II. Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp-18-19
  414. Beevor (2006). p. 84.
  415. Beevor (2006). p. 85.
  416. Preston (2006).
  417. Beevor (2006). p. 83.
  418. Thomas (1961). p. 176.
  419. "Shots of War: Photojournalism During the Spanish Civil War". Archived from the original on 9 March 2009. Retrieved 24 June 2009.
  420. Beevor (2006). pp. 172–173.
  421. Beevor (2006). p. 161.
  422. Beevor (2006). pp. 272–273.
  423. Payne, Stanley G., and Jesús Palacios. Franco: A personal and political biography. University of Wisconsin Pres, 2014, p.194
  424. Beevor (2006). p. 87.
  425. Beevor (2006). pp. 102–122.
  426. Beevor (2006). p. 40.
  427. Payne (1999). p. 151.
  428. Beevor (2006). p. 253.
  429. Arnaud Imatz, "La vraie mort de Garcia Lorca" 2009 40 NRH, 31–34, pp. 32–33.
  430. Beevor (2006). p. 255.
  431. Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sofia, El pueblo español tiene un camino que conduce a una estrella (maqueta) (There Is a Way for the Spanish People That Leads to a Star [Maquette]).
  432. Museum of Modern Art.
  433. Pablo Picasso.
  434. SUNY Oneota, Picasso's Guernica.
  435. Stanley Meisler, For Joan Miró, Painting and Poetry Were the Same.
  436. TATE, 'The Reaper': Miró's Civil War protest.
  437. Bolorinos Allard, Elisabeth. "The Crescent and the Dagger: Representations of the Moorish Other during the Spanish Civil War." Bulletin of Spanish Studies 93, no. 6 (2016): 965-988.
  438. Whealey, Robert H. (1989). Hitler and Spain : The Nazi Role in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939 (1 ed.). University Press of Kentucky. pp. 72–94. ISBN 978-0813148632.
  439. Thomas, Hugh (2001). The Spanish Civil War. Modern Library. p. xviii & 899–901.
  440. Thomas, Hugh, Op.Cit.
  441. Bahamonde, Ángel; Cervera Gil, Javier. Así terminó la Guerra de year. Madrid: Marcial Pons. ISBN 84-95379-00-7.
  442. Payne, Stanley G. (2008). Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany, and World War II. Yale University Press. p. 336. ISBN 978-0-300-15021-6. JSTOR j.ctt5vks5w.
  443. Payne, Stanley G. Spain: A unique history. Univ of Wisconsin Press, 2011, p.194
  444. Payne, Stanley G. the Spanish civil War, the Soviet Union, and communism. Yale University Press, 2008, pp.313-314
  445. Cooley, Alexander (2008). Base Politics : Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 57–64. ISBN 978-0801446054.


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  • Santos, Juliá; Casanova, Julián; Solé I Sabaté, Josep Maria; Villarroya, Joan; Moreno, Francisco (1999). Victimas de la guerra civil (in Spanish). Madrid: Temas de Hoy.
  • Seidman, Michael (2011). The Victorious Counter-revolution: The Nationalist Effort in the Spanish Civil War. University of Wisconsin Press. ISBN 978-0-299-24964-9.
  • Stoff, Laurie (2004). Spain. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press.
  • Taylor, F. Jay (1971) [1956]. The United States and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939. New York, NY: Bookman Associates. ISBN 978-0-374-97849-5.
  • Thomas, Hugh (2003) [1961, 1987, 2001]. The Spanish Civil War. London, England: Penguin. ISBN 0-14-101161-0. OCLC 248799351.
  • Werstein, Irving (1969). The Cruel Years: The Story of the Spanish Civil War. New York, NY: Julian Messner.
  • Westwell, Ian (2004). Condor Legion: The Wehrmacht's Training Ground. Ian Allan.

Further reading

  • Brouè, Pierre (1988). The Revolution and the Civil War in Spain. Chicago, IL: Haymarket. OCLC 1931859515.
  • Carr, Sir Raymond (2001) [1977]. The Spanish Tragedy: The Civil War in Perspective. Phoenix Press. ISBN 1-84212-203-7.
  • De Meneses, Filipe Ribeiro Franco and the Spanish Civil War, Routledge, London, 2001
  • Doyle, Bob (2006). Brigadista: an Irishman's fight against fascism. Dublin: Currach Press. ISBN 1-85607-939-2. OCLC 71752897.
  • Francis, Hywel (2006). Miners against Fascism: Wales and the Spanish Civil War. Pontypool, Wales (NP4 7AG): Warren and Pell.
  • Graham, Helen (2002). The Spanish republic at war, 1936–1939. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-45932-X. OCLC 231983673.
  • Graham, Helen (1988). "The Spanish Socialist Party in Power and the Government of Juan Negrín, 1937–9". European History Quarterly. 18 (2): 175–206. doi:10.1177/026569148801800203..
  • Hill, Alexander (2017). The Red Army and the Second World War. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-1070-2079-5..
  • Ibarruri, Dolores (1976). They Shall Not Pass: the Autobiography of La Pasionaria (translated from El Unico Camino). New York: International Publishers. ISBN 0-7178-0468-2. OCLC 9369478.
  • Jellinek, Frank (1938). The Civil War in Spain. London: Victor Gollanz (Left Book Club).
  • Kowalsky, Daniel (2004). La Union Sovietica y la Guerra Civil Espanola. Barcelona: Critica. ISBN 84-8432-490-7. OCLC 255243139.
  • Low, Mary; Breá, Juan (1979) [1937]. Red Spanish Notebook. San Francisco: City Lights Books (originally by Martin Secker & Warburg). ISBN 0-87286-132-5. OCLC 4832126.
  • Monteath, Peter (1994). The Spanish Civil War in literature, film, and art: an international Bibliography of secondary literature. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. ISBN 0-313-29262-0.
  • Pérez de Urbel, Justo (1993). Catholic Martyrs of the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939, trans. by Michael F. Ingrams. Kansas City, MO: Angelus Press. ISBN 0-935952-96-9
  • Preston, Paul (2012) [2012]. The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain. London: Harper Press. ISBN 978-0-00-255634-7.
  • Puzzo, Dante Anthony (1962). Spain and the Great Powers, 1936–1941. Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press (originally Columbia University Press, N.Y.). ISBN 0-8369-6868-9. OCLC 308726.
  • Southworth, Herbert Rutledge (1963). El mito de la cruzada de Franco [The Myth of Franco's crusade] (in Spanish). Paris: Ruedo Ibérico. ISBN 84-8346-574-4.
  • Wheeler, George; Jones, Jack (2003). Leach, David (ed.). To Make the People Smile Again: a Memoir of the Spanish Civil War. Newcastle upon Tyne: Zymurgy Publishing. ISBN 1-903506-07-7. OCLC 231998540. (trade unionist)
  • Wilson, Ann (1986). Images of the Civil War. London: Allen & Unwin.

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