Port security

Port security is part of a broader definition concerning maritime security.It refers to the defense, law and treaty enforcement, and counterterrorism activities that fall within the port and maritime domain. It includes the protection of the seaports themselves and the protection and inspection of the cargo moving through the ports. Security risks related to ports often focus on either the physical security of the port, or security risks within the maritime supply chain[1].

Internationally, port security is governed by rules issued by the International Maritime Organization and its 2002 International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. Additionally, some United States-based programs have become de facto global port security programs, including the Container Security Initiative and the Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism. However, some businesses argues that port security governance measures are ineffective and costly and that it negatively impacts maritime transport costs[2][3].

Physical Port Security

Physical port security involves the risks to the perimeters of the port. Risks to port security involves natural risks such as hurricanes and flooding, man- made risks such as operator error, and weapon risks such as chemical, biological and nuclear material[4]. It also involves adequate security systems within the port, such as security guards, video surveillance and alarm systems[5].

Physical port security also goes under the umbrella of maritime terrorism[6]. Ports are attractive targets for terrorists because ships and cargoes are fixed in time once they enter the port, which removes the uncertainty in relation to the location of the target[7].

Maritime Supply Chain and Port Security

Apart from physical port security, the port is connected to a larger supply chain. There are various risks along this supply chain that can affect port security, such as explosives attached to the vessel or unwanted passengers on the vessel. Ports are "potential targets of illegal activity which may impact their ability to function as intended, and ports as conduits into and out of national borders and supply chains, which can be exploited in order to introduce or move illegal materials, persons, or activities”[8]. That involves increasing the number of vulnerabilities to port security to the supply chain.

Port Security Risk Management

Security risk management practices of ports reflect the divide between physical and maritime supply chain security.

Physical Port Security Risk Management

Examples of security risk management practices at ports are: employment of a security director, crisis leadership, contingency planning and the use of intelligence[9]. Other measures include physical security barriers, such as CCTV cameras and adequate light at the port in order to ensure that cargo theft does not take place[10].

Maritime Supply Chain Risk Management

Examples of risk management practices within the maritime supply chain includes ISPC (International Ship and Port Facility Security Code), CSI (Container Security Initiative) and whole-of- supply chain outcomes, CTPT (Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism)[11]. These efforts have been criticised as the use of quantitative and statistical approach to security in the maritime supply chain is argued to overlook low probability, high impact events[12].

Privatisation of Port Security

Port security is often in the literature depicted as a responsibility of the state, as it concerns national security. Yet, the emergence of private security actors has also influenced aspects of port security governance. In the case of a port in Indonesian, the involvement of so many different types of state and non- state agencies actually lessened security[13].

Emerging Port Security Risks

Cyber Risks

Ports use a variety of sensors, such as Wi- Fi and satellite- based Internet systems which are increasingly automated. Such systems are vulnerable to penetration and manipulation and risk being misused for hacktivism and by terrorists[14]. Not only can this affect port security in terms of the parameters of the surface of the port, but a possible hacking of data can be used to trace ships and mislead them for hijacking purposes[15].

Liquefied Natural Gas Trade

Technological developments coupled with the US Shale Revolution has allowed for increasing exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG). The commodity, consisting of 70-90 percent methane and 0-20 percent of butane, propane and ethane is similar to crude oil as it forms through pressurising and heating[16].

LNG derives at onshore or offshore ports, where the infrastructure at the port contains terminals that brings the LNG further. It can either be attached to a gas liqufication or storage plant, a regasification and storage plant or just a storage and distribution plant[17]. The infrastructure at LNG terminals are therefore concerned with highly flammable content that is of security risk to personnel. Onshore LNG ports that are located close to cities or dense populations are also a security risk to the area surrounding the port[18]. Risks to port security will vary considerably and depend on the waiting position of a tanker, location of the port, and security risk management practices of each specific port[19].

LNG is naturally linked to maritime terrorism, as disputed areas and chokepoints -such as the Strait of Malacca and Singapore Strait- has the potential to result in hijacking and bombs as the area becomes more active[20]. As the new demand centres for LNG is most notably in Asian countries such as China, India, Japan and South Korea, new geopolitical tensions might increase in the region between LNG- exporting countries such as the US, Russia and Qatar[21]. This also relates to energy security, as import dependent countries are vulnerable to a sudden stop in supply of LNG[22].

Port security in the United States

In the United States, port security is handled jointly by the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, both components of the Department of Homeland Security. Local law enforcement agencies and the FBI also have a role in port security at the local and regional level.

Port security gained prominence politically in 2006 due to the sale of British company P&O Ports (including its American port assets) to Dubai Ports World. The ensuing controversy led to charges that the purchase would pose a national security risk. In March 2006, Dubai Ports World announced that it would sell off its American assets, and they were sold to AIG in December 2006. The new attention to port security that the controversy generated led to the passage of the SAFE Port Act (H.R. 4954) in Congress in 2006.

Vulnerabilities

The importance of the container shipping industry is equally matched by its vulnerabilities to terrorist attack. The U.S. maritime system consists of over 300 sea and river ports with more than 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals. The United States and global economies depend on commercial shipping as the most reliable, cost efficient method of transporting goods, with U.S. ports handling approximately 20% of the maritime trade worldwide.[23] The volume of trade throughout the U.S. and the world creates a desirable target for terrorist attack. An attack on any aspect of the maritime system, mainly major ports, can severely hamper trade and potentially affect the global economy by billions of dollars.

The security of ports and their deficiencies are numerous and leave US ports vulnerable to terrorist attack. The vulnerabilities of our ports are many, leading to potential security breaches in almost all aspects of the container shipping industry. With the sheer volume of maritime traffic, there is serious concern of cargo/passenger ship hijackings and pirate attack, as well as accountability of the millions of shipping containers transported worldwide. Given the overwhelming number of ships and containers, there are many areas of concern regarding the security of U.S. ports.

Cargo containers represent the largest area of concern in terms of security and vulnerability. With an estimated global inventory of over 12 million, the securing, tracking, and inspection of all shipping containers is a difficult task.[24] The largest obstacle to overcome with cargo and port security is cost: the cost of inspecting the containers, and the cost of shipping delays from those inspections. A large container ship has the capacity to carry in excess of 3,000 containers, making inspection impossible without disrupting shipment. More than 6 million cargo containers enter U.S. seaports annually, of which only 2% are physically inspected by Customs.[24]

Terrorists can, and eventually may, exploit the shipping industries deficiencies in cargo security. Potential threats include the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), a radiological "dirty" bomb, a conventional explosive device, and transportation of terrorist operatives, as well. Studies have claimed a Hiroshima sized nuclear detonation at a major seaport would kill fifty thousand to one million people.[25] The container shipping system is an attractive outlet for terrorist activities. It is common knowledge within the industry that security measures of major ports cannot have a significant effect on the movement of goods,[23] thereby allowing exploitation of the system for terrorist use. Container shipping is an amalgam of many different actors: the exporter, the importer, freight forwarder, customs broker, excise inspectors, truckers, railroad workers, dock workers, and the crews of the vessels themselves.[23] Greenberg (2006) states "that whenever and wherever a container is handled during movement represents a potential vulnerability for the security and integrity of the cargo".[23] This produces many different windows of opportunity for terrorist infiltration of containers.

There are other areas of vulnerability that terrorist may infiltrate. The geographical/physical layout of the ports themselves is of concern. The protection and security of the landside perimeter of a port is difficult due to their large size. Ports located in highly urbanized areas allow terrorists a densely populated area in which to hide while infiltrating or escaping the port area at their perimeter. The high volume of trucks entering and exiting port facilities pose a threat to the port, as well as surrounding geographical areas. Exiting trucks may contain WMD or terrorist operatives that are to infiltrate a surrounding metropolitan area, i.e., transporting a chemical explosive device (from the Port of Los Angeles) to a more densely populated area (downtown Los Angeles). Container ships anchored at port facilities are particularly vulnerable to both highjacking and explosive devices as they are stationary targets. Most crews of cargo ships are unarmed, and would be defenseless to an armed attack. The disabling of a ship at port is enough to halt all activity at that port for an extended period of time, especially if the disabled ship is blocking a throughway for other vessels.

The economic impact of such an attack would be disastrous on a global scale. An example of such an economic impact can be drawn from a labor-management dispute that closed ports along the west coast of the United States. These port closures cost the U.S. economy approximately $1 billion per day for the first 5 days, and rose exponentially thereafter.[24] When the International Longshore and Warehouse Union strike closed 29 West Coast ports for 10 days, one study estimated that it cost the United States economy $19.4 billion.[26] Many manufacturing companies of the world employ a just-in-time distribution model, allowing for lower inventory carrying costs and savings from warehouse space. The shipping industry is essential to this method, as its speed and reliability allow new inventory to be shipped and received precisely when it is needed. The adopting of the just-in-time method has dropped business logistics cost from 16.1% of U.S. GDP to 10.1% between 1980 and 2000.[24] Although this method has dropped costs significantly, it has put a stranglehold on security options, as the shipping times of these shipments are exact and cannot afford delays from inspection. Other aspects of economic impact include costs of altering shipping routes away from a disabled port, as well as delays from ports operating over capacity that receive the rerouted ships. Most ports operate at near capacity and can ill afford an attack of this nature.

Although there are many government sponsored agencies involved with port security, the responsibility of providing that security is of state and local governments. Allen (2007) states that "under the protective principle, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce laws against acts that threaten vital state interests". The protective principle "recognizes that a state may apply its laws to protect vital state interests, such as the state's national security or governmental functions".[27] Some ports may enact their own police forces in addition to city law enforcement.

Federal agencies that are involved with port security include the Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). These three agencies are now under the jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland Security. The Maritime Administration (MARAD) is also, while the Coast Guard and Customs are the two prominent agencies at ports. The Coast Guard is responsible for evaluating, boarding, and inspecting commercial ships as they approach U.S. waters, for countering terrorist threats in U.S. ports, and for helping to protect U.S. Navy ships in U.S. ports. CBP's primary responsibility is the inspecting of cargo, including containers that commercial ships bring into U.S. ports. CBP is also responsible for the inspection of ship crews and passengers aboard the vessel. The TSA's focus was initially focused on air transportation, but now has the authority of all modes of transportation. MARAD is a civilian agency that is part of the Department of Transportation. MARAD publishes Maritime Security Reports and national planning guides on port security.[24]

There have been proposals to consolidate federal agencies responsible for border security. The consolidation may offer some long-term benefits, but three challenges may hinder a successful implementation of security enhancing initiatives at the nations ports: standards, funding, and collaboration.[28]

The first challenge involves implementing a set of standards that defines what safeguards a port should have in place. Under the Coast Guard's direction, a set of standards is being developed for all U.S. ports to use in conducting port vulnerability assessments. However, many questions remain about whether the thousands of people who have grown accustomed to working in certain ways at the nation’s ports will agree to, and implement, the kinds of changes that a substantially changed environment will require.

The second challenge involves determining the amounts needed and sources of funding for the kinds of security improvements that are likely to be required to meet the standards. Florida's experience indicates that security measures are likely to be more expensive than many anticipate, and determining how to pay these costs and how the federal government should participate will present a challenge.

The third challenge is ensuring that there is sufficient cooperation and coordination among the many stakeholders to make the security measures work. Experience to date indicates that this coordination is more difficult than many stakeholders anticipate, and that continued practice and testing will be key in making it work.

The September 11 attacks demanded a new initiative be taken in maritime security efforts. The Coast Guard is initializing an approach that will improve the quality and timing of shipping and carrier information so that it may be properly evaluated for terrorist threats. This allows more time for proper recognition of vessels, and will aid in the flow of legitimate shipping vessels. Together with the Navy, the Coast Guard has developed the use of maritime domain awareness, which is essentially the collection of all intelligence gathered from government agencies, and assembled to provide a common operating picture.[29]

CBP has initiated new programs to aid in counter terrorist efforts by creating the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The CSI consists of four core elements: Using intelligence and automated information to identify and target containers that pose a risk for terrorism, pre-screening those containers that pose a risk at the port of departure before they arrive at U.S. ports, using detection technology to quickly pre-screen containers that pose a risk, and using smarter, tamper-evident containers. Under C-TPAT, shippers commit to improving the security of their cargo shipments, and in return, they receive a variety of benefits from the government.[30]

Policing

Whilst the threat of terrorism cannot be totally be dismissed the day-to-day operations of port and harbour police more often deals with more mundane issues, such as theft (including pilferage by dock workers), smuggling, illegal immigration; health and safety with regards to hazardous cargoes, safe docking of vessels, and safe operation of vehicles and plant; environmental protection e.g. spillages and contaminated bilge water.

See also

References

  1. https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/notions-of-maritime-green-supply-chain-management/60518
  2. Edgerton, M., 2013. A Practitioner's Guide to Effective Maritime and Port Security. s.l.:John Wiley & Sons, Inc..
  3. Clark, X., Dollar, D. & Micco, A., 2004. Port Efficiency, Maritime Transport Costs and Bilateral Trade, Cambridge, MA: Working Papers 10353: National Bureau of Economic Research.
  4. Russel, D. L. & Arlow, P. C., 2015. Industrial Security: Managing Security in the 21st Century. s.l.:John Wiley & Sons, Inc..
  5. Russel, D. L. & Arlow, P. C., 2015. Industrial Security: Managing Security in the 21st Century. s.l.:John Wiley & Sons, Inc..
  6. Edgerton, M., 2013. A Practitioner's Guide to Effective Maritime and Port Security. s.l.:John Wiley & Sons, Inc..
  7. Edgerton, M., 2013. A Practitioner's Guide to Effective Maritime and Port Security. s.l.:John Wiley & Sons, Inc..
  8. Edgerton, M., 2013. A Practitioner's Guide to Effective Maritime and Port Security. s.l.:John Wiley & Sons, Inc..
  9. McNicholas, M. A. & Piper, E., 2016. Security Management and Leadership in Seaports. In: M. McNicholas, ed. Maritime Security. Oxford: Elsevier, pp. 383-426.
  10. McNicholas, M., 2016. Maritime Security. Oxford: Elsevier.
  11. Barnes, P. H. & Oloruntoba, R., 2005. Assurance of Security in Maritime Supply Chains: Conceptual Issues of vulnerability and Crisis Management. Journal of International Management, 11(4), pp. 519-540.
  12. Edgerton, M., 2013. A Practitioner's Guide to Effective Maritime and Port Security. s.l.:John Wiley & Sons, Inc..
  13. Sciascia, A., 2013. Monitoring the Border: Indonesian Port Security and the Role of Private Actors. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 35(2), pp. 163-187.
  14. Sen, R., 2016. Cyber and Information Threats to Seaports and Ships. In: M. McNicholas, ed. Maritime Security. Oxford: Elsevier, pp. 281-302.
  15. Sen, R., 2016. Cyber and Information Threats to Seaports and Ships. In: M. McNicholas, ed. Maritime Security. Oxford: Elsevier, pp. 281-302.
  16. Grigas, A., 2017. The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  17. Grigas, A., 2017. The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas. Cambridge: Harvard University Press
  18. Lee, P. T.-W. & Chang, Y. T., 2010. Impact of port security on liquefied natural gas and container cargo movements. In: P. Kee & H. Yoshimatsu, eds. Global Movements in the Asia Pacific. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., pp. 323-340.
  19. Bubbico, R., Di Cave, S. & Mazzarotta, B., 2009. Preliminary risk analysis for LNG tankers approaching a maritime terminal. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Volume 22, pp. 634-638.
  20. Lee, P. T.-W. & Chang, Y. T., 2010. Impact of port security on liquefied natural gas and container cargo movements. In: P. Kee & H. Yoshimatsu, eds. Global Movements in the Asia Pacific. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., pp. 323-340.
  21. Grigas, A., 2017. The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  22. Lee, P. T.-W. & Chang, Y. T., 2010. Impact of port security on liquefied natural gas and container cargo movements. In: P. Kee & H. Yoshimatsu, eds. Global Movements in the Asia Pacific. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., pp. 323-340.
  23. Greenberg, M. D., et al. (2006). Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
  24. Frittelli, J. F., et al. (2003). Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues. New York: Novinka Books.
  25. Abt, Clark C. (2003). The Economic Impact of Nuclear Terrorist Attacks on Freight Transport Systems in an Age of Seaport Vulnerability. Retrieved March 19, 2008, from http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/es-economic_impact_of_nuclear_terrorist_attacks.pdf
  26. Cohen, Stephen. (2006). "Boom Boxes: Containers and Terrorism", in Protecting the Nation's Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost. Retrieved March 19, 2008 from http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report /R_606JHR.pdf#page=179
  27. Allen, C. H. (2007). Maritime Counterproliferation Operations and the Rule of Law. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
  28. United States Accounting Office. (2002, August). Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New Initiatives Successful. Retrieved November 18, 2008 from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02993t.pdf
  29. Unknown. (2005, September). Intelligence: Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). Retrieved March 19, 2008, from GlobalSecurity.org Web site: http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/mda.htm
  30. Unknown. (2007, March). Homeland Security: Container Security Initiative (CSI). Retrieved March 20, 2008, from GlobalSecurity.org Web site: http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/csi.htm
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.